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ATKINS, ADOLESCENCE AND THE MATURITY
HEURISTIC: RATIONALES FOR A CATEGORICAL
EXEMPTION FOR JUVENILES FROM CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT
Jeffrey Fagan*

Abstract
In Atkins v. Virginia, the U.S. Supreme Court held that mentally retarded
people lacked a range of developmental capacities that were necessary to establish
the higher threshold of culpability for the execution of murderers in the Court’s
death penalty jurisprudence. The Court emphasized that the impairments of mental
retardation lead to a “..special risk of wrongful execution.” The Court had
previously concluded that the limitations in developmental capacities that
characterize mentally retarded defendants also characterize a significant proportion
of adolescent offenders. These parallels invite an extension of the Atkins Court’s
reasoning to juveniles by highlighting the diminished capacity for culpability common
to offenders of both groups.
This Article addresses the logic and substance of an extension of Atkins to
juveniles. Extending Atkins to juveniles requires analyses showing that: (a) many of
the developmental characteristics that establish the diminished culpability of the
mentally retarded also characterize adolescents, (b) the age-specific competencies for
adolescents that define maturity and in turn culpability can be identified and then
reliably measured, and (c) the age at which adolescents attain these competencies
and when their developmental trajectory begins - that is, the age at which adolescent
development measurably departs, both substantively and permanently, from the
stable and flat developmental trajectories of the mentally retarded. The Article
discusses recent evidence on the developmental capacities of adolescents showing
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that that many of the same deficits in cognitive and neuropsychological
developmental that define “retardation” also are common markers of adolescence,
and elements of immaturity long recognized in death penalty jurisprudence:
diminished capacities to (a) understand and process information, (b) learn from
experience and mistakes, engage in logical reasoning, (c) foresee the consequences of
their actions, (d) control impulses, (e) understand the reactions of others, and (f)
resist peer influence.
Accordingly, the Article begins by decomposing the diagnostic category of
retardation into specific dimensions of underdevelopment. Next, the Article analyzes
the correspondence of these dimensions of underdevelopment among the retarded to
legal standards about immaturity and culpability of adolescents. If children are in
fact less “formed” developmentally than adults, they lack full capacity and therefore
are “less culpable” than adults. Empirical research shows that a significant number
of juveniles have a pattern of developmental and cognitive incapacities that places
them well below the threshold of culpability that also exempts the mentally retarded
under Atkins. In addition, adolescents will vary in the age when they realize these
threshold developmental competencies that constitute maturity and in turn
culpability, complicating attribution of full culpability to adolescents at the higher
threshold set in death penalty jurisprudence. Recent evidence also suggests that brain
development in areas controlling the developmental components of maturity may be
incomplete at age 18 or beyond.
The Article concludes because defendants with diminished competence and
culpability, like the mentally retarded, are immature at age 18 and beyond, that there
is sufficient evidence in social science to create a categorical exemption from capital
punishment for adolescents who commit murders before the age of 18. The
alternative – creating exempted categories such as the immature – invites disputes
about how to reliably establish membership. Such classifications will be unreliable
and inevitably suffer from the subjective risks of misdiagnosis, testing error,
instrument unreliability, or other limits of behavioral science. To ignore the logic of
Atkins elevates the risk of an erroneous attribution of cognitive and volitional
maturity to a seemingly competent adolescent whose developmental reality may be
exactly the opposite, raising the terrible risk of a death sentence where it is not
deserved.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Atkins v. Virginia,1 the U.S. Supreme Court voted six to three to bar further
use of the death penalty for mentally retarded offenders. The Court offered three reasons
for banning the execution of the retarded. First, citing a shift in public opinion over the
thirteen years since Penry v Lynaugh,2 the Court in Atkins ruled that the execution of the
mentally retarded is “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
Second, the Court concluded that retaining the death penalty for the mentally retarded
would not serve the interest in retribution or deterrence that are essential to capital
jurisprudence. Atkins held that mentally retarded people lacked a range of developmental
capacities that were necessary to establish the higher threshold of culpability for the
execution of murderers that the Court had established in Furman,3 Gregg,4 Coker,5
Woodson v. North Carolina,6 and Enmund.7 Third, the Atkins Court noted that the
impairments of mental retardation lead to a “special risk of wrongful execution.”8
The Atkins decision, though welcomed by both both popular and legal policy
audiences, naturally raises the question: what about juveniles? After all, the very same
limitations in developmental capacities that characterize mentally retarded defendants also
characterize a significant proportion of adolescent offenders.9 The parallels between capital
punishment for adolescents and for the mentally retarded have been echoed both in popular
and legal discourse since the resumption of capital punishment following Furman. 10 Prior

1

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
3
Furman v. Georgia, 408 US 238 (1972)
4
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 US 153 (1976)
5
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)
6
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)
7
Enmund v Florida, 458 US 782 (1982)
8
Atkins at 350.
9
See, e.g., Ruben C. Gur, Declaration of Ruben C. Gur, PhD, Patterson v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 24
(Mem) (2002), Petition for Writ of Certiorari to US Supreme Court, J., Gary Hart, Counsel (available at:
www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/patterson.html, visited March 20, 2003). See, also, Juvenile Justice
Center, Criminal Justice Section, American Bar Association, Adolescent Brain Development and Legal
Culpability (available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/factsheets _brain_development.pdf,
visited March 20, 2003).
10
The American Bar Association resolution calling for a ban on the execution of individuals
for capital crimes committed before their 18th birthday also calls for a ban on executions of the mentally
retarded:
The ABA has established policies against the exe cution of both persons with
"mental retardation," as defined by the American Association of Mental
Retardation, and persons who were under the age of 18 at the time of their offenses.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of executions in
2
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to Atkins, many groups protested the use of capital punishment for both types of offenders,
invoking arguments against capital punishment that applied equally to each.11 The popular
coupling of concerns about adolescents with concerns about the retarded seemed to
naturally invite an extension of the Atkins court’s reasoning to juveniles by highlighting the
diminished capacity for culpability common to offenders of both groups.12 In fact, on
August 30, 2002, in a rare dissent from an order declining to stay an execution, Justices
Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg urged the court to reconsider the constitutionality of allowing
juveniles to be sentenced to death. 13 In reference to the Atkins decision, the justices
argued that reexamining the “juvenile” issue was warranted, thereby underscoring yet again
the similarities between both cases.
Whether these Justices were referring to normative concerns or scientific evidence
is unclear. Both clinical and empirical evidence suggest, however, that many of the same
deficits in various cognitive competencies that define “retardation” also are markers of
adolescence. In Atkins, the Court found that persons with mental retardation have
“diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract
from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control
impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.”14 Recent empirical and theoretical
scholarship on the developmental capacities of adolescents generally and adolescent

both of those instances. While many states now bar executions of the retarded,
other states continue to execute both retarded individuals and, on occasion,
offenders who were under 18 at the time they committed the offenses for which they
were executed (See American Bar Ass'n, Resolution of the House of Delegates (Feb.
1997), reprinted in Victor Streib, Moratorium on the Death Penalty for Juveniles, 61
L. & Contemp. Probs. 219, Appendix (Autumn 1998).
11
However, several commentators opposed this linkage. Id at 221. “For analysis, the young
and the retarded should not be treated the same, and generally are not for legal and governmental
purposes such as rights to vote, to drink, to marry, and the like. In actual practice, as is discussed later
in this article, the legislatures and courts have not treated these categories the same for purposes of
the death penalty.” See, Victor L. Streib, Executing Women, Children, and the Retarded: Second
Class Citizens in Capital Punishment, in A MERICA'S EXPERIMENT W ITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT :
REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT , A ND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 201 (James R.
Acker et al. eds., 1998).
12
A May 2002 CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll, conducted one month before the Atkins
decision, found that 64 percent of Americans support the death penalty, but 69 percent of Americans
oppose executing juveniles. About 58 percent of the American population lives in states that prohibit
the execution of juveniles, compared to 51 percent who live in states that opposed execution of the
mentally retarded at the time that Atkins was decided. See, Amnesty International, Indecent and
Internationally Illegal; The death penalty against child offenders (http://web.amnesty.org/ ;
September 25, 2002).
13
See, Patterson v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 24 (Mem) (2002) (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer dissenting).
See, also, Adam Liptak, Three Justices Call for Reviewing Death Sentences for Juveniles, The New
York Times; August 30, 2002.
14
Atkins. at 2250-51
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offenders in particular suggest that adolescence itself is characterized by a constellation of
development deficits that closely align with the developmental incapacities of the mentally
retarded.15 In fact, these characteristics may be so closely aligned as to establish their
categorical similarity.
This cluster of developmental incapacities place both adolescents and mentally
retarded persons below the threshold of culpability that constitutional jurisprudence
mandates in capital cases.16 Extending the logic of Atkins to juveniles, then, requires
analyses showing that: (a) many of the developmental characteristics that establish the
diminished culpability of the mentally retarded also characterize adolescents, (b) the agespecific competencies for adolescents that define maturity and in turn culpability can be
identified and then reliably measured, and (c) the age at which adolescents attain these
competencies and when their developmental trajectory begins - that is, the age at which
adolescent development measurably departs, both substantively and permanently, from the
stable and flat developmental trajectories of the mentally retarded.
The latter question further complicates the application of the Atkins holdings to
juveniles. Bright lines are not the preferred conclusions of social scientists, often to the
frustration of legal scholars.17 The age at which adolescents realize the developmental
competencies that constitute culpability will vary: a significant number of juveniles will be
immature and lacking in the developmental attributes of culpability well before age 18, and
some may still lack these competencies after age 18; a few may have attained full maturity

15

See infra notes 78 and 79 and accompanying text.
The Court in Atkins also stated that mentally retarded persons less likely to meet tests that
establish their trial competence: they are more vulnerable to false confessions and less able to assist
counsel at trial, they are “…less likely [to] process the information of the possibility of execution as a
penalty,” making them vulnerable to “…a special risk of wrongful execution” (Id. at 2251-52). The
Association of Retarded Citizens (ARC) points out that a mentally retarded individual may (a) pretend
to understand concepts that he does not; (b) not want his condition to be viewed as a disability (c)
attempt to act more mature than his faculties will allow; (d) say what he thinks others want to hear; (e)
be overwhelmed by the presence of authority; and (f) have a difficulty describing the details of events
to others. See Several Statements about Mental Retardation, ARC Statements;
http://www.geocities.com/savepenry, last accessed on October 1, 2002. These same incompetencies
limit the ability of adolescents to meet the procedural standards for trial as an adult. See, generally,
Robert Schwartz and Thomas Grisso (eds.), YOUTH ON TRIAL (2000). Despite the conceptual and
empirical convergence of the dimensions of competence and culpability, I focus in this essay only on
the question of culpability.
17
See, for example, Lee Epstein and Gary King, The Rules of Inference,,UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
LAW REVIEW 69: 1-119 (2000); Robert C. Ellickson, Trends in Legal Scholarship: A Statistical Study,
JOURNAL OF LEGAL S TUDIEs, 29: 517 (2000); Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical,
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW , 26: 807 (1999).
16
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by the age threshold of 16 set by the U.S. Supreme Court in Stanford v. Kentucky,18 but
most will not. In other words, the risk of serious reversible error is higher for adolescents
due to the variability in the age at which they attain the cognitive and other developmental
capacities necessary to be culpable for their criminal acts. Failing to account for this fact
invites the risk of executing an adolescent whose culpability does not rise to the
constitutional thresholds defined in Atkins or other death penalty cases that set a high bar of
culpability. 19 This risk is acute and more jurisprudentially challenging than the
considerations that attach to mentally retarded adults.
This Article addresses these questions by first examining both the jurisprudence and
social science of retardation. Whereas the courts have given primacy to determinations of
IQ to assess mental retardation, clinical and epidemiological evidence suggests that
retardation is a multidimensional diagnostic category, and that its determination is fraught
with scientific judgments that carry varying degrees of error. The Court recognized this
complexity in Atkins, pointing out the significance of social and psychological
underdevelopment. Accordingly, the Article begins by decomposing the diagnostic category
of retardation into specific dimensions of underdevelopment. Second, the Article analyzes
the correspondence of these dimensions of underdevelopment among the retarded to legal
standards about immaturity and culpability of adolescents. If children are in fact less
“formed” developmentally than adults, they lack full capacity and therefore are “less
culpable” than adults. But what characteristics define immaturity among adolescents, and
how do these mirror the incapacities of retarded adults? Finally, the Article addresses both
the convergence of the two vectors of underdevelopment, and the difficulty of establishing
reliable chronological markers when such capacities attain. A substantial number of
adolescents sentenced to death for crimes committed before age 18 will reflect a pattern of
developmental and cognitive incapacities that place them well below the threshold of
culpability that also exempts the mentally retarded under Atkins. Death penalty
jurisprudence suggests that sentencing these persons to death invites the risk of serious
error. These issues all highlight the conflict between normative and social science
considerations of maturity, capacity and development, which both further complicate the
extension of Atkins to adolescents and present challenges for the imminent debate about
the executions of minors.

18
19

492 US 361 (1989)
See, Atkins at 2250, and infra note 237.
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II. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RETARDATION
A. Penry and the Culpability of Mentally Retarded People
In Penry v. Lynaugh the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment
did not categorically prohibit the execution of mentally retarded people convicted of capital
offenses.20 Johnny Paul Penry had been convicted of the brutal rape and murder of Pamela
Carpenter in her home in Livingston, Texas, in October 1979. A clinical psychologist had
testified at a competency hearing before trial that Penry was mentally retarded with an IQ
of 54.21 The psychologists testified that Penry had the mental age of a 6 ½ year old, that
his ability to function socially with the world was also that of a nine- or ten-year old, that he
suffered from moderate retardation that led to poor impulse control and an inability to learn
from his own experiences, and that it was impossible for him to appreciate the wrongfulness
of his conduct or to change his own behavior to conform to the law due to organic brain
damage he had suffered as a child.22
The Supreme Court’s discussion of the treatment of mentally retarded persons in
Penry focused primarily on “idiots” and “lunatics” in common law.23 In tracing the common
law prohibition against punishing “idiots” and “lunatics,” the Court quotes Blackstone who
wrote:
The second case of a deficiency in will, which excuses from the guilt of
crimes, arises also from a defective or vitiated understanding, viz. in an
idiot or a lunatic. . . . [I]diots and lunatics are not chargeable for their
own acts, if committed when under these incapacities: no, not even for
treason itself. . . . [A] total idiocy, or absolute insanity, excuses from the
guilt, and of course from the punishment, of any criminal action committed
under such deprivation of the senses. . ."24
The Court also quoted Hale on the culpability of a man born deaf and mute who,
“…is in presumption of law an idiot . . . because he hath no possibility to understand what

20

492 US 302 at 280 (1989).
This would place Penry in either the category of “mild” retardation (individuals with an IQ
score range of 50-55 and 70) or “moderate” retardation (IQ scores in the range of 35-40 to 50-55),
according to the AAMR classifications. See, Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and
Systems of Supports 5 (9th ed. 1992), quoted in Atkins at 2245.
22
Penry v. Lynnaugh, supra note 20 at 2937.
23
Id at 286.
24
W. Blackstone, 4 Commentaries 24 -- 25 (emphasis in original), quoted at 286.
21
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is forbidden by law to be done, or under what penalties: but if it can appear, that he hath
the use of understanding, . . . then he may be tried, and suffer judgment and execution." 25
Having generally established mental retardation as a factor that may reduce one’s culpability
for a criminal act, the Court addressed the issue of whether, because of their diminished
culpability, the imposition of capital punishment on individuals with mental retardation would
be unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s protection against ”cruel and unusual
punishment”. After reviewing state statutes, the Court held that no national consensus had
emerged on the issue and that procedural safeguards that allowed sentencers to consider
mitigating factors would allow for an individualized determination to be made in every case.
Relying on a publication of the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) that
described the mentally retarded as “a heterogeneous population, ranging from totally
dependant to nearly independent people,” the Court stated:
In light of the diverse capacities and life experiences of mentally retarded
persons, it cannot be said on the record before us today that all mentally
retarded people, by definition, can never act with the level of culpability
associated with the death penalty.” (at 338, 339).
Rejecting a categorical exclusion, and acknowledging that mentally retarded
individuals suffer from an impairment of certain cognitive abilities, the Court still held that the
degree of culpability possessed by Penry and a class of individuals with similar abilities was
adequate to justify the imposition of the death penalty.26
B.

The Cognitive and Developmental Components of Mental Retardation

Thirteen years after Penry, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Atkins v.
Virginia,27 and once again addressed the question of whether the imposition of capital

25

M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown 34 (1736) quoted at 287.
Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor stated that: “….retardation has long been
regarded as a factor that may diminish culpability, and, in its most severe form, may result in complete
exculpation…. Mentally retarded persons, however, are individuals whose abilities and behavioral
deficits can vary greatly depending on the degree of their retardation, their life experience, and the
ameliorative effects of education and habilitation. On the present record, it cannot be said that all
mentally retarded people of petitioner's ability--by virtue of their mental retardation alone, and apart
from any individualized consideration of their personal responsibility--inevitably lack the cognitive,
volitional, and moral capacity to act with the degree of culpability associated with the death penalty.
Moreover, the concept of "mental age" is an insufficient basis for a categorical Eighth Amendment
rule, since it is imprecise, does not adequately account for individuals' varying experiences and
abilities, [and] ceases to change after a person reaches the chronological age of 15 or 16….” Penry,
supa note 20, at 306.
27
122 S.Ct. 2242 (2002)
26
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punishment on mentally retarded people was unconstitutional. In Atkins, however, the
Court overturned the Penry decision citing among other factors the emergence of a national
consensus against the execution of mentally retarded people. The Court stated that “the
consistency of the direction of change” among the state legislative enactments on the issue
“provides powerful evidence that today our society views mentally retarded offenders as
categorically less culpable than the average criminal.”28 Note 21 in Atkins elaborated upon
the positions taken by professional and religious organizations and even foreign nations to
evidence a “broader social and professional consensus.”29 These positions focused on both
subaverage general intellectual functioning (i.e., low IQ) and significant limitations in social
and interpersonal behaviors broadly categoriezed as “adaptive functioning.”
1. IQ as a Focal Marker of Retardation
The Supreme Court in Atkins initially cited a series of narrow definitions that
focused heavily on IQ as a marker of retardation. For example, the American Association
on Mental Retardation (AAMR) definition states:
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present functioning.
It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning,
existing concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the following
applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living,
social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional
academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation manifests before age
18.30
The American Psychiatric Association’s definition also was presented in Atkins :
The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is accompanied by
significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following
skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal
skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic
skills, work, leisure, health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur
before age 18 years (Criterion C). Mental Retardation has many different

28

Id. at 2249
Id. at 2249
30
Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports 5 (9th ed. 1992),
quoted in Atkins at 2245.
29
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etiologies and may be seen as a final common pathway of various
pathological processes that affect the functioning of the central nervous
system.31
The World Health Organization, whose International Statistical Classification of
Diseases and Related Health Problems (tenth revision) enjoys greater acceptance
internationally, also focuses on IQ.in its definition of mental retardation: 32
Degrees of mental retardation are conventionally estimated by
standardized intelligence tests. These can be supplemented by scales
assessing social adaptation in a given environment.33
The emphasis on intelligence noted here has been pervasive in statutory definitions
of mental retardation. Virtually every state statute that prohibits the execution of “mentally
retarded” persons, defines such a condition as “a mental deficit that has resulted in
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with significant
limitations in adaptive functioning, where the onset of the forgoing conditions occurred
before the defendant reached the age of eighteen.”34 In addition, about one-third of the
states have set a maximum numerical IQ level for a mentally retarded individual - nearly all
use a threshold of 70).35

31

American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
41, 41-49 (4th ed. 2000).
32
World Health Organization, International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related
Health Problems (Tenth Revision) (ICD-10) 91, 91-93 (1999).
33
Id at 91.
34
See, for example, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3982. All statutes prohibiting the death penalty for
people with mental retardation can be found at: http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicmrstatutes.html ;
Last Accessed October 1, 2002.
35
See, James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation And The Death Penalty: A Guide To State
Legislative Issues. Most of the existing state legislation on this topic define mental retardation in
general terms, as “concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior,” but also generally apply the definition to
persons with an IQ score of 70 or below, and additionally some individuals with scores in the low 70s
(and even mid-70s), depending on the nature of the testing information. See, for example, See, e.g.,
TENN. CODE A NN. § 39-13-203(a)(1)-(3) (1997); W ASH. REV. CODE A NN. § 10.95.030(2)(a) (West Supp.
2002). However, the identification of the upper boundary of mental retardation cannot be stated with
complete precision in terms of IQ scores. This upper boundary of IQs to classify a person as mentally
retarded reflects the statistical variance inherent in all intelligence tests and the need to accommodate
clinical judgment. AAMD, Classification (1983) 11 (AThis upper limit is intended as a guideline; it
could be extended upward through IQ 75 or more, depending on the reliability of the intelligence test
used. This particularly applies in schools and similar settings if behavior is impaired and clinically
determined to be due to deficits in reasoning and judgment@); APA, DSM-IV-TR at 41-42 (AThus it is

2003]

ATKINS, ADOLESCENCE AND THE JUVENILE DEATH P ENALTY

11

The clinical, scientific and normative issues regarding the culpability of mentally
retarded individuals did not evolve much in the years between the Penry and Atkins
decisions. No major advancements in the classification of mental retardation had been
reported in the intervening time, and IQ remained the focal point in clinical and statutory
definitions of mental retardation. The Court’s reasoning in Atkins was focused more on the
normative consensus emerging in the states and less on changing professional views of the
capacities of individuals whose IQ hovers at the widely recognized threshold of 70.
However, the emphasis on IQ masks important developmental competencies that are
concomitants of mental retardation, and that form the scientific and conceptual basis for
extending the inner logic of Atkins to adolescents. This dimensionality is examined next.

2. The Dimensionality of Mental Retardation
The Court in Atkins recognized the limitations of a narrow and singular definition of
mental retardation, and invoked a definition more consistent with the Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence of Enmund, Woodson, Coker and other cases. Despite the hegemony of
IQ as a marker of retardation in both clinical practice and state law, Atkins went beyond
the normative consensus to articulate a jurisprudence of mental retardation that bears
directly on the culpability of mentally retarded persons (MRP's) for criminal sanctions
generally. The Court then goes on to locate their culpability relative to the higher capital
standard set by Endmund and other cases that constitute the “death is different” capital
jurisprudence.
Unlike Penry, which relied upon the “’idiots’ and ‘lunatics’” jurisprudence of the
common law, the characterizations of retardation in Atkins relied upon not just clinical
definitions of mental retardation but ranged wider to embrace social science evidence that
establish characteristics of mental retardation. That is, the Court coupled the extrinsic
sociopolitical consensus argument with a second more descriptive and straight-forward
approach: invoking justice. By relying on simple biological and psychological arguments to

possible to diagnose Mental Retardation in individuals with IQs between 70 and 75 who exhibit
significant deficits in adaptive behavior@). See generally, American Psychological Association,
Manual of Diagnosis and Professional Practice in Mental Retardation (John W. Jacobson & James
A. Mulick eds. 1996); National Research Council, Mental Retardation: Determining Eligibility for
Social Security Benefits 5 (National Academy Press 2002). Despite the desirability of a bright line
standard measurable by a single IQ test, Ellis says that other factors must be considered to inform and
contextualize the clinical judgment of experienced diagnosticians. This fact is reflected in the Atkins
decision, where the Court noted that “…an IQ between 70 and 75 is typically considered the cutoff IQ
score for the intellectual function prong of the mental retardation definition.” 122 S.Ct. at 2245 n.5.
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explain why mentally retarded individuals should not be held to the same standards of
culpability as fully developed adults, the Atkins Court makes an important statement about
the role of accountability in capital cases.
At the fulcrum of this discussion are the dynamics of social and mental
development. The court posits that,
Because of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of
their impulses. . .[mental retarded persons] do not act with the level of
moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct.
Moreover, their impairments can jeopardize the reliability and fairness of
capital proceedings against [them].36
This reasoning presupposes a fundamental point: mentally retarded individuals are
not as psychologically, mentally, and socially developed as normal adults, and therefore do
not display the same abilities of reason or culpability. There are several steps to take in
arguing for this logical progression by the Court. The first and most important is to examine
the various definitions of “mental retardation” found in law, medicine, and psychology to
ascertain a more comprehensive understanding of what is essential in demarcating a
mentally retarded individual from an average adult. Turn again to the Court’s own words.
The
Atkins
Court
instructs:
Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between right
and wrong and are competent to stand trial. Because of their impairments,
however, by definition they have diminished capacities to understand and
process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn
from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to
understand the reactions of others. There is no evidence that they are more
likely to engage in criminal conduct than others, but there is abundant
evidence that they often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a
premeditated plan, and that in group settings, they are followers rather than
leaders.37

36

Atkins at 2250.
Id. at 2250 and Notes 23 and 24. The Court cited social science evidence on this point: J.
McGee & F. Menolascino, The Evaluation of Defendants with Mental Retardation in the Criminal
Justice System, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND M ENTAL RETARDATION 55, 58-60 (R. Conley, R.
Luckasson, & G. Bouthilet eds.1992); Appelbaum &Appelbaum, Criminal-Justice Related
Competencies in Defendants with Mental Retardation, 14 J. of Psychiatry & L. 483, 487-489 (Winter
1994); Ellis & Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 414, 429
(1985); Levy-Shiff, Kedem, & Sevillia, Ego Identity in Mentally Retarded Adolescents, 94 A M. J.
37
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The logic seems self-evident: because of a stall in mental and social development, these
individuals are biologically more vulnerable to outside influence, to acting on impulse, and to
not thinking through the consequences of their actions. Atkins specifically references
characteristics common to both the mentally retarded and juveniles: a susceptibility to
influence, a lack of maturity and perspective, and a lower degree of moral culpability.38
The Court concluded that these deficiencies may not exempt mentally retarded persons
from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish the culpability well below the constitutional
threshold for a death sentence.39
For example, adopting the recommendations of the Utah Sentencing Commission,40
the Utah legislature recently passed SB 8, incorporating the Atkins decision into Utah law,41
and the Governor signed it into law on March 15, 2003. The bill sets up a procedure to
make the mental retardation determination before trial. A defendant found mentally retarded
could still be tried for murder, but could not be subjected to the death penalty. IQ is only
one of many factors to be considered in classifying a person as mentally retarded.42 The
definition in Utah's proposed law reads that a person would be regarded as mentally
retarded if the individual "has significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that
results in and exists concurrently with significant deficits in adaptive functioning in the areas
of reasoning, judgment and impulse control, manifested prior to age 22.”43
The Utah statute also states that a person's IQ should not be the only determining
factor since different IQ tests produce different results, since IQ often is considered a range

M ENTAL RETARDATION 541, 547 (1990); Whitman, Self Regulation and Mental Retardation, 94 Am. J.
M ENTAL RETARDATION 347, 360 (1990); Everington & Fulero, Competence to Confess: Measuring
Understanding and Suggestibility of Defendants with Mental Retardation 37 M ENTAL RETARDATION
212, 212-213, 535 (1999).
38
These characteristics were defined for juveniles below the age of 18 in Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-117, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); See, generally, Elizabeth Scott,
Judgment and Reasoning of Adolescents, infra note 78.
39
Atkins at 2250-51.
40
See, Utah Sentencing Commission Minutes, Committee: Sentencing Committee, October 9,
2002 (available at http://www.justice.utah.gov/MinutesAgendas/sentmin/October.pdf , visited April 15,
2003).
41
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-2-305, amended by 2003 Utah Laws Ch. 11 (S.B. 08) (March 15, 2003).
42
Id.
43
. S.B. 8, Utah Senate, § 77-15a-102: “Mentally retarded defined. As used in this chapter, a
defendant is "mentally retarded" if: (1) the defendant has significant subaverage general intellectual
functioning that results in and exists concurrently with significant deficiencies in adaptive functioning
that exist primarily in the areas of reasoning or impulse control, or in both of these areas; and (2) the
subaverage general intellectual functioning and the significant deficiencies in adaptive functioning
under Subsection (1) are both manifested prior to age 22.”
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rather than a fixed number, and using the traditional IQ of 70 would be both overinclusive
and underinclusive. The statute further states that the signs of retardation should have
emerged before age 22, although there was sharp internal division within the Commission
over this provision. Finally, the statute recommended that the death penalty should not be
sought against a mentally impaired person who confesses to a crime unless there is outside
corroborating evidence. The statute prohibits a death sentence if a case revolves only
around a confession from a person with a sub-average intellect that is not corroborated by
other evidence.
However, Utah may be atypical where it focuses on markers other than IQ to
determine degrees of mental retardation. Many current statutes in other states require two
necessary elements to declare a defendant mentally retarded: low intellectual functioning
and subnormal adaptive behavior.44 These statutes typically define a broad definition for
each of these requirements. Most states, however, set the intellectual functioning standard
at a specified IQ level (70 or 75), or they leave the evaluation in the hands of a court
appointed psychologist. And, some states have not provided any definition for the adaptive
behavior prong of mental retardation, leaving it open to court interpretation. South Dakota
and Tennessee are examples of states using this approach.45 Many states have taken steps
to define the “adaptive behavior” element. Arizona, Connecticut, and Kansas are virtually
identical in their wording in this respect.46 North Carolina and Missouri provide more
comprehensive definitions of each component of the definition. For example, Missouri
statutes decompose adaptive behavior into specific components: “…communication, selfcare, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional
academics, leisure and work, which conditions are manifested and documented before
eighteen years of age.”47
While there are some differences in defining the "adaptive behavior" prong of

44

All statutes prohibiting the death penalty for people with mental retardation can be found
at: http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicmrstatutes.html, visited October 1, 2002.
45 For example, Tennessee statutes are typical in drawing a bright line for IQ, but leaving
vague the criteria for determining “adaptive” behavior. The issue of age of determination attests to the
dimension of stability that informs several statutes, an inherent claim of the intractability and organic
nature of the disability. “(a) As used in this section, ‘mental retardation' means: (1) Significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning as evidenced by a functional intelligence quotient (I.Q.) of
seventy (70) or below; (2) Deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) The mental retardation must have
been manifested during the developmental period, or by eighteen (18) years of age” Tenn. Code. Ann.
Tit. 39. Ch 13.
46 The Connecticut statute defines subaverage functioning as: “[s]ignificantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested
during the developmental period”; and adaptive behavior ‘…means the effectiveness or degree with
which an individual meets the standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected
for the individual's age and cultural group.” .Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-1g (2001)
47 Section 565.030 R.S.Mo
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mental retardation among the various statutes on point, each state with such a definition
includes one common element: the defendant lacks independence and social responsibility
in relationship to others in that community or cultural group. Only the Utah statute thus far
has taken the additional step to incorporate specific markers of developmental incapacities
into a definition of mental retardation. Social science, and especially developmental
psychology, has taken note of the specific dimensions of adaptive behavior, generally
offering a broader definition that includes: (a) initiating, interacting and terminating
interaction with others; (b) regulating one’s own behavior and controlling impulses; (c)
making choices; and (d) conforming conduct to laws.48 In this regard, the states’ statutes
lag well behind the social science evidence on the cognitive, emotional regulatory, and
neuropsychological deficits that comprise retardation.49

3. The Culpability of Mentally Retarded Offenders in Capital Cases
The Court in Atkins stated that “… only the most deserving of execution are put
to death…If the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme
sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability…surely does not merit that form of
retribution.” (emphasis added). Accordingly, even if a mentally retarded murderer does not
meet the strict statutory requirements of being “significantly subaverage” in their intellectual
and adaptive abilities, he or she are sufficiently subaverage on the dimensions of “adaptive
behavior” to substantially challenge the assertion that a mentally retarded person should
ever be considered one of “the most deserving of execution.”
The bridge between legal responsibility and moral responsibility can be understood
at the intersection of the two purported goals of the criminal justice system, punishment and
deterrence. A minimum amount of cognitive understanding is necessary for either goal to
be served in any measurable manner. If the defendant is so mentally retarded that he has
no understanding of right and wrong or does not have the memory capacity to recollect the
crime for which he is being held accountable, then we can assume that he will not be able
appreciate the relationship between his action and the punishment. Also, other similarly
situated individuals, lacking the same cognitive abilities, will not have the mental capacity to

48 See Alan S. Kaufman, Assessing Adolescent and Adult Intelligence (1990) at 549 for a
discussion of adaptive skills. See also Jacobson, John W. and James A Mulick, eds, Manual of
Diagnosis and Professional Practice in Mental Retardation (1996), at 27.
49
See, generally, McGee, Appelbaum and Appelbaum, supra n. 18. See, also, A.K.
Dowling, Post-Atkins Problems with Enforcing the Supreme Court's Ban on Executing the Mentally
Retarded, 33 Seton Hall L. Rev. 733 (2003); Note, Implementing Atkins, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2565
(2003).
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understand the crime-punishment relationship or control their actions to conform to social
norms. By most clinical definitions, a mentally retarded person’s capacity is permanently
frozen at a particular mental age.50 Thus, if an individual lacks the capacity to make a moral
judgment about right and wrong and alter their actions in accordance with their moral
judgment, then it serves no function to place moral blame and punishment upon that actor.
In Atkins, the Court stated two significant reasons for disallowing the execution of
mentally retarded offenders. First, given the characteristics of their disability, mentally
retarded peopleare not uniquely culpable under the law. Where the Court in Gregg
identified retribution and deterrence as the social purposes served by the death penalty, 51
there is substantial doubt about whether retribution in cases involving the mentally retarded
is best served by executing them. In Godfrey v. Georgia, for example, the Court set aside
a death penalty because the crimes did not reflect a consciousness materially more
“depraved than that of any person guilty of murder.”52 Indeed, the Atkins Court similarly
recognized that mentally retarded persons have diminished capacity to understand and
process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience,
and to control impulses.53 Accordingly, the Court adopted a functionalist perspective,
arguing that the application of capital punishment to mentally retarded offenders did not
serve the retribution goal of matching the severity of the punishment to the crime.
The Atkins Court also held that mentally retarded persons are unlikely to realize a
deterrent effect of capital jurisprudence. Explaining that the same cognitive impairments
which classify individuals as mentally retarded also interfere with their ability to understand
the law, the Court held that the deterrent effect of possible capital punishment is essentially
lost prospective mentally retarded offenders.
[I]t is the same cognitive and behavioral impairments that make these
defendants less morally culpable -- for example, the diminished ability to

50

American Association on Mental Retardation, Mental Retardation: Definition,
Classification, and Systems of Supports 1 (Ruth Luckasson ed., 10th ed. 2002) (hereafter AAAMR,
Mental Retardation (2002)”). In addition to providing the current definition of mental retardation and
explaining related concepts and terminology, the 2002 edition of this manual provides valuable
background on such topics as the history of classification, clinical assessment of people with mental
retardation, and an extensive bibliography of references to the clinical literature. See www.aamr.org.
The formulation in the 2002 AAMR definition requires that the individual manifest Aa disability
characterized by significant limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as
expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills.” Id. Any behavioral adjustments or
changes over time by mentally retarded persons do not signify improvements in mental functioning,
but reflect only the ability to overcome “adative limitations” from life experience/habit. Id.
51 Gregg v Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)
52 446 US 420 (1980)
53 Akins, at 2250.
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understand and process information, to learn from experience, to engage in
logical reasoning, or to control impulses -- that also make it less likely that
they can process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty
and, as a result, control their conduct based upon that information. Nor
will exempting the mentally retarded from execution lessen the deterrent
effect of the death penalty with respect to offenders who are not mentally
retarded. Such individuals are unprotected by the exemption and will
continue to face the threat of execution. Thus, executing the mentally
retarded will not measurably further the goal of deterrence.54
The Gregg Court relied on Enmund v. Florida, noting “… it seems likely that
"capital punishment can serve as a deterrent only when murder is the result of premeditation
and deliberation.”55 Citing Fisher v U.S.,56 the Gregg Court continued to explain “…for if
a person does not intend that life be taken or contemplate that lethal force will be employed
by others, the possibility that the death penalty will be imposed for vicarious felony murder
will not "enter into the cold calculus that precedes the decision to act.”57 Regarding the
coupling of deterrence and retribution, the Enmund Court found that unless the death
penalty contributes to one or both of these goals, capital punishment “is nothing more than
the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering," and hence an
unconstitutional punishment.58 Absent a consciousness not just of the moral wrong of
murder, but of the aggravating conditions that qualify the case for death, the culpability of
the average murderer is insufficient for the death penalty. Furthermore, if a mentally
retarded person lacks the logical reasoning skills, the maturity, and the ability to think in
long-range causal terms, as some argue, it is inconsistent to hold such a person to the higher
standard of either legal responsibility or moral culpability required for a death sentence.
The Court next explained that the disabilities of the mentally retarded not only affect
decision-making during the commission of theircrimes, but also affect them after they have
been apprehended and convicted. In this respect, the Court found that the same
psychological and intellectual inferiority that leads to the poor decision to commit the act in
the first place also “undermines the strength of the procedural protections that our capital
jurisprudence steadfastly guards.”59 If an individual is more likely to be intimidated by
authority, to be poor, to have a difficult time recounting events in great detail, and to act in a

54 Atkins at 2251
55 458 U.S., at 798, 799, 102 S.Ct. 3368
56 Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 484, 66 S.Ct. 1318, 1328, 90 L.Ed. 1382 (1946)
57 Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S., at 186, 96 S.Ct., at 2931 (footnote omitted)
58 Coker v. Georgia, supra, 433 U.S., at 592, 97 S.Ct., at 2866.
59 Atkins at 2250.
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manner beyond which his intellectual faculties can sustain him, the criminal process is likely
to be an unjust burden.
Mentally retarded persons are, by definition, deficient in many of these areas, and
are therefore at a distinct disadvantage in the capital process. In addition to holding that the
goals of the death penalty were not furthered by the inclusion of the mentally retarded, the
Atkins Court overruled Penry’s holding that consideration of mitigating factors by the
sentencer will adequately ensure individualized consideration in determining a mentally
retarded defendant’s culpability. The diminished capacity of mentally retarded persons to
competently participate in the trial process contributes to their higher risk of serious error in
both the trial and sentencing phases of capital trials. It is not hard to imagine how a
mentally retarded person might have lesser ability to make persuasive showing of mitigation.
For example, citing recent exonerations involving false confessions and “the lesser ability of
mentally retarded defendants to make a persuasive showing of mitigation,” the Court stated
that “[m]entally retarded defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful
execution.”60

C. The Court’s Role in Diagnosing Mental Retardation
Before the Atkins decision, mental retardation was considered as a mitigating
factor to punishment in death penalty cases. If the level of mental retardation was not so
severe as to affect the defendant’s competency to stand trial, the courts were not required
to make any special determinations or adopt any specific procedural standards when
dealing with a defendant with “mild” or “moderate” mental retardation. Judges were not
required to change their procedures to conform to the clinical definitions of mental
retardation. Rather, juries were often presented with the testimony of expert witnesses who
testified about both the IQ of defendants and their individual developmental characteristics.
In Penry, a clinical psychologist testified at a competency hearing before trial that
Mr. Penry was mentally retarded with an IQ of 54.61 The psychologists testified that based
on his evaluation, Mr. Penry had the mental age of a 6 ½ year old and that his ability to
function socially with the world was also that of a 9- or 10-year old. However, Mr.
Penry’s moderate to mild levels of mental retardation did not weigh heavily enough in the
eyes of the jury to prevent him from adequately representing his interests and the jury found
Penry competent to stand trial.

60 Atkins, at 2252
61 This would place Penry in either the category of “mild” retardation (individuals with an IQ
score range of between 50 or 55 and 70), or “moderate” retardation (IQ scores in the range from a low of
35-40 to 50-55), according to the AAMR classifications.
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At trial, Penry’s attorneys raised an insanity defense (one alternative for mentally
retarded defendants who are not so severely impaired as to be deemed unable to stand
trial) and the testimony of another psychiatrist was introduced. The psychiatrist testified
that the defendant suffered from moderate retardation that led to poor impulse control and
an inability to learn from his own experiences. In addition, the psychiatrist testified because
of the organic brain damage Mr. Penry suffered at an early age, it was impossible for him to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to change his own behavior to conform to the
law.
The State presented testimony of two psychiatrists in rebuttal. One psychiatrist
testified that the defendant was not suffering from any mental defect or illness at the time of
the crime, while the other testified that he had personally diagnosed Penry as mentally
retarded in both 1973 and 1977, but that Mr. Penry was legally sane at the time of the
crime. In the face of the dueling testimonies of the three psychiatrists, the jury rejected Mr.
Penry’s insanity defense and rendered a guilty verdict.
Good law during the Penry case did not require the jury to categorically exempt
Mr. Penry from capital punishment simply by virtue of his mental retardation. Rather, the
defense was permitted to present testimony about his mental development, such as his
violent upbringing, that the jury would weigh along side other mitigating factors.
Accordingly, in this case, the jury was allowed to consider the testimony of different expert
witnesses who delivered competing testimony supporting claims that the defendant was or
was not mentally retarded. Given the inconsistency of the psychological evaluations, the
jury chose not to heavily weigh Mr. Penry’s mental development.
In most cases, prosecuting attorneys tend to use this ambiguity to their advantage.
In Wills v. Texas, the prosecuting attorney was quoted during closing of the original trial as
urging the jury not to “have any sympathy for the defendant because he's a little slow or he's
borderline mentally retarded . . . Don't say 'Poor Old Bobby Joe, he's a little slow, he's
borderline mentally retarded. Let's give him a break.”62
As the dueling expert witnesses in Penry show, there is considerable disagreement
among mental health professionals when rendering a diagnosis of mental retardation in
individual cases. Historically, the courts have not been required to resolve questions about
a defendant’s possible mental retardation. Rather, the role of the courts has been to
provide a forum for the presentation of multiple diagnoses. Although this apparent
inconsistency in the reliability of mental retardation diagnoses has made its way into the
courtroom, the lack of a categorical exemption for people with mental retardation has
temporarily provided a way for the criminal justice system to avoid addressing the threshold
question of exactly when someone is mentally retarded. As in Penry, the challenge of

62 511 US 1097 (1994) (citing Pet. For Cert. 10).
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understanding a defendant’s mental condition has been pushed onto the jury, consistent
with the recent Supreme Court decision in Apprendi v. New Jerse63y and Ring v.
Arizona.64 This becomes a very difficult task, however, where ordinary citizens are forced
to evaluate the mental development of a defendant in situations where reasonable mental
health professionals themselves disagree.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins has fundamentally changed the order in
which this inquiry will occur. By granting a categorical exemption from capital punishment
to people who are mentally retarded, the threshold question of exactly who qualifies as
“mentally retarded” now looms before the Court. Although the actual process by which
this will occur will develop cumulatively in individual cases over time, judges and juries will
have to answer this question in a definitive manner.65
Presently, there are two paths the criminal justice system can take in creating a legal
threshold for mental retardation. First, the clinical definitions of mental retardation are well
established, and these definitions may be accepted wholesale. Here, the advantages are
three-fold. One advantage is that clinical definitions already exist and are in wide
circulation. Examples include definitions offered by the AAMR, the APA in its publication
the DSM-IV and the WHO in its publication the ICD-10.66 A second advantage is that the
scientific method is used when conducting clinical evaluations. This is a widely accepted
analytic method and enjoys broad acceptance both by the judiciary and prospective jurors.
Lastly, the scientific research underlying clinical definitions endows these classifications with
a certain amount of legitimacy. Where dueling expert witnesses testify, however, a court
would nonetheless be faced with a credibility determination.
The second path the courts may take is creating a legal definition of mental
retardation, perhaps to be determined in a separate hearing much the like modern pre-trial

63

530 U.S. 466, 490 (2001). In Apprendi, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that “any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a
prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” As a matter of
due process, any fact that might lead to an enhanced sentence that would increase the maximum
penalty my be fournd by a jury using a reasonable doubt standard.
64
536 U.S. 584 (2002). See, also, infra notes 70-72
65 See, John H. Blume and Pamela Blume Leonard, Principles of Developing and Presenting
Evidence of Mental Retardation, __ The Champion (2000). The Court’s decision in Atkins makes clear
that its holding extends to all defendants who Afall within the range of mentally retarded offenders
about whom there is a national consensus. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347-8. This means that while states are
free to adopt variations in the wording of the definition, they cannot adopt a definition that
encompasses a smaller group of defendants, nor may they fail to protect any individuals who have
mental retardation under the definition embodied in the national consensus. Both judge and jury will
have significant roles in the determination of whether a defendant is mentally retarded. See, Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
66 AAMR’s definition is most widely accepted within the United States, but the WHO’s
definition is most widely used internationally.
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competency hearings. The obvious criticism that would arise is that lawyers and judges are
endowing themselves with ability to make psychiatric diagnoses. This would create a
problem similar to what existed when juries were allowed to independently weigh mental
retardation as a mitigating factor.
The Court in Atkins offered an analysis of the value of clinical definitions of mental
retardation when imported into the world of criminal culpability:
[C]linical definitions of mental retardation require not only subaverage
intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such
as communication, self-care, and self-direction that became manifest
before age 18. Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference
between right and wrong and are competent to stand trial. Because of their
impairments, however, by definition they have diminished capacities to
understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from
mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to
control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others. [footnote
omitted]. There is no evidence that they are more likely to engage in
criminal conduct than others, but there is abundant evidence that they often
act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in
group settings they are followers rather than leaders. [footnote omitted].
Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but
they do diminish their personal culpability.67
The presentation of these clinical definitions provided the Court with objective
clinical and medical criteria which it could rely upon for its analysis of reduced legal
culpability. This language may prove to be a starting point for courts in choosing the path
ahead.
Finally, Ring v. Arizona68 raised additional questions as to whether the judge or the
jury makes the determination whether the defendant is mentally retarded. Ring involved a
Sixth Amendment challenge to Arizona’s judge-sentencing capital punishment scheme.
Defendant Ring argued that the Sixth Amendment requires that any finding of fact that
makes a defendant eligible for the death penalty must be unanimously made by the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.69 While Ring dealt specifically with statutory aggravating

67

Atkins, at 2250.
Ring, 536 U.S. 584.
69
Id at 597 n.4.
68
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circumstances, it included “..factfinding[s] necessary to . . . put [a defendant] to death.”70
Applying Ring, a mentally retarded defendant is now constitutionally ineligible for the death
penalty.71 Since mental retardation is now a factual issue upon which a defendant’s
eligibility for death turns, “that fact . . . must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt”. 72
While Ring would seem to put the task of determining whether a defendant is
mentally retarded into the jury’s hands, the trial judge also has a very important role to
play.73 In Atkins, the Court prohibited execution of the mentally retarded in part by
recognizing that retarded persons suffer in litigating issues in front of juries, which in turn
exposes them to “a special risk of wrongful execution.”74 Trial courts are obligated to
conduct hearings on the admission of evidence regarding the defendant=s possible mental
retardation. Both the defense and the prosecution would have the opportunity to present
evidence, including expert testimony. After considering the evidence, the court should find
the defendant to be not death eligible if it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the defendant has mental retardation. 75 If the defendant is found to be not death eligible
because of mental retardation, the trial could proceed as a non-capital trial, and, if
convicted, the defendant could be sentenced to any penalty available under state law, other
than death. If, on the other hand, the court finds that the defendant is not mentally retarded,
and thus potentially eligible for the death penalty, the case could proceed as a capital trial. 76

70

Id. at 609.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
72
Ring, 36 U.S. at 600.
73
See, generally, John H. Blume and Pamela Blume Leonard, Principles of Presenting
Mental Health Evidence in Criminal Cases, at http://dpa.state.ky.us/library/advocate/jan02/
mentalh.html (last visited September 24, 2003).
74
Akins, 536 U.S. at 320-21 (noting: (1) the difficulty a mentally retarded person may have in
testifying; (2) the possibility that a mentally retarded person’s “…demeanor may create an unwarranted
impression of lack of remorse;” and, (3) the possibility that the mental retardation evidence may
enhance the likelihood that future dangerousness will be found by the jury).
75
A Court could decide that the prosecution would have the burden of establishing that the
defendant is not mentally retarded by a higher burden, e.g, clear and convincing evidence or beyond a
reasonable doubt. While a higher burden may not be constitutionally required at this stage, it would
serve to save the costs of going through a capital trial in cases where it is likely the jury will ultimately
determine, using the constitutionally required higher standard, that the defendant is mentally retarded
at step two. See, Blume and Leonard, supra note 73.
76
As in Jackson, the bifurcated approach makes sense because its two prongs address two
separate (although factually related) questions. The first, to be addressed by the judge, is the legal
issue of whether the defendant is a person who is eligible for the death penalty. If the court does not
find the defendant death-eligible because of mental retardation, it would be unconstitutional to proceed
with a capital trial. The second inquiry, by the jury, is whether the prosecution has demonstrated that
the defendant is factually an individual upon whom the death penalty may be imposed. Condemning a
defendant to death who has properly raised the issue of mental retardation then becomes Acontingent
71
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Thus, both judge and jury participate in the determination of the classification of mental
retardation, in effect constructing and administering a gate through which capital defendants
must pass should the prosecution seek the death penalty.

D. Summary
The difficulty of operationalizing the dimensions of retardation into a reliable set of
indicia for legal or even clinical decision making challenge the “bright line” jurisprudence that
is implied by Atkins. More central to this article are the parallels in the construction of such
indicia that are problematic in drawing a “bright line” threshold for retardation, with the
complexity of the construct of maturity that underlies the legal construction of adolescence.
An even more direct extension, implied by the comments of the three U.S. Supreme Court
justices about adolescence and the death penalty, publicly stated shortly after the Atkins
decision, is whether the developmental deficits of the mentally retarded apply to
adolescents who commit murders and face execution. Do the deficits of retardation
describe the developmental limitations of adolescents? The next section examines this
question.

III. ADOLESCENCE, DEVELOPMENT AND CULPABILITY
A. The Social and Legal Construction of Childhood
[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life
when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological
damage. Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that
minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and
responsible than adults.77
Traditionally, many areas of law have recognized the unique status of children. The
Common Law allowed for special treatment of children in almost all areas of law, including
contracts, family law, criminal justice and numerous other fields of governmental regulation.
It is nearly universal in the law to assume that children are immature, unable to protect

on the finding of a fact that is a necessary precondition to a capital sentence. Ring, 536 U.S. 584
(emphasis added).
77 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 US 104 at 115 (1982)
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themselves from others and from their own mistakes, and therefore are in need of adult
supervision.78 Their immaturity often is accompanied by dependencies on adults for basic
survival needs, such as food, shelter, health care and education. As Professor Elizabeth
Scott shows, two dimensions of immaturity – cognitive development and judgment – makes
children incompetent to reason and make rational choices.79 Children also are assumed to
be plastic, and thus vulnerable to both influence and harm from others.
These disabilities – incompetence, vulnerability and dependency – are expressed in
several areas of legal regulation: the right to vote, consent to medical procedures, drink
alcohol, drive motor vehicles, accept employment, enter into contracts,80 join the military,
marry, and go to prison. Professor Scott points out that adolescents’ First Amendment
free speech rights – that is, their access to regulated speech as well as their rights to
expression – are more limited than those of adults, in part, because the U.S. Supreme
Court assumed that children may be vulnerable to potentially harmful effects of some forms
of speech. 81 Children are subject to curfews that would be unconstitutional for adults.82
This longstanding framework of legal regulation of adolescence suggests that both law and
policy view children as a group whose unique traits and circumstances warrant a special
protective and regulatory scheme.
Historically, there has been no definitive age for determining when children have
attained the capacities to function as adults. Rather, externalities -- changes and
developments in society -- often have had an effect on raising and lowering the age
standard. That is, the assignment of age-specific competencies tends to reflect
contemporary social constructions of adolescence. Just as the context and meaning of

78 See gen. Elizabeth Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 37
Villanova L. Rev. 1607 (1992); Franklin E. Zimring, CHANGING LEGAL W ORLD OF A DOLESCENCE 36
(1982).
79 See generally, Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 547, 558-62 (2000)
80 Minors are liable only on contracts for necessaries. Under the traditional rule, minors can
disaffirm other contracts, at their option, returning consideration in possession, but with no liability for
use or damage. Under the modern (minority) rule, minors can disaffirm, but must compensate the
contracting party for use or damage, unless overreaching by the other party is involved. See
discussion in S. Davis, E. Scott, W. Wadlington, & C. Whitebread, CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
101-6 (1997).
81 Thus, for example, the Supreme Court has held that the state can restrict children’s access
to obscene material that would be protected speech for adults, and that public school officials can
censor material in school newspapers. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding New York
statute restricting sale of “obscene material” to minors); Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260 (1988) (upholding the prior restraint of a school newspaper);
82 Courts recognize that curfew ordinances would violate the rights of adults to move about
in public, but uphold carefully tailored ordinances that are directed at juveniles. See, for example,
Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 963 F. Supp. 534 (W.D. Va. 1997), aff’d 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998).
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adolescent behaviors shift, so too do the age boundaries for the corresponding behavior.
For example, the moral panic surrounding teenage drunk driving animated a sudden and
sharp increase in the minimum legal drinking age.83 In the United States, the upward trend
in the age of capacity for children has been linked to industrialization, growing societal
wealth and an accompanying interest in education.84 These developments have together
contributed to the greater ability of American society to invest more resources in the
education and upbringing of our youth.
The law has expressed the boundaries of childhood by setting categorical
boundaries that reflect broad and sometimes changing norms in a series of age-specific
competencies. These boundaries have anticipated and balanced the social need to integrate
children into civil society with the need to protect them from concomitant harms. This is
true even though such “bright line” rules may not exactly mirror the developmental age when
children attain those functions. Scott suggests that there is little evidence that, in most
contexts, the interests of adolescents are harmed by a regime of binary classification or
bright line demarcating the attainment of adult competence.85 These boundaries did,
though, balance several objectives. Often, legal regulation that lowered or raised the
threshold of legal adulthood served both a broader public interest and the interest of the
adolescents who were classified as adults.86 The granting of adult responsibility assumed

83

According to Goode & Ben-Yehuda, "A moral panic is characterised by the feeling, held by
a substantial number of the members of a given society, that evil-doers pose a threat to the society and
to the moral order as a consequence of their behaviour and, therefore, "something should be done"
about them and their behaviour." (p. 31). Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda, “The American
Drug Panic of the 1980s,” in M ORAL PANICS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF DEVIANCE 140 (1994).
Evidence of an increase in traffic accidents related to alcohol in the late 1970s created pressure on state
legislatures to raise the legal drinking age. From September 1976 through January 1983, sixteen states
raised the legal age to 21. Then because of more pressure in 1984, the federal government enacted the
Uniform Drinking Age Act and any states that did not raise the legal drinking age to 21 would receive
reduced federal highway construction funds. See 23 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. IV 1999).
84 Clement, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2002).
85 Scott, Legal Construction of Adolescence, supra n. 68 at 547. Professor Scott claims that
the binary classification works well, regardless of whether behavior-specific boundaries depart from the
reality of developmental maturity. Sharp boundaries provide a clear signal of the attainment of adult
legal status, and by varying the age at which adult rights and duties are granted for different functions
(drinking, driving, marriage, work, military service, consent to medical procedures, entering into
contracts, freedom from curfew), adolescents transit from childhood to adulthood gradually, without
creating an intermediate category for adolescence. Id at 548.
86 Scott, id at 578. Perhaps the best counterfactual for gradualism in granting adult
responsibilities is the case of abortion. In, the Supreme Court required that a minor be given the
opportunity (through a hearing) to demonstrate her maturity and ability to make an autonomous
decision. This judicial by-pass hearing prescribed in Bellotti v. Baird (443 U.S. 622 (1979), created a
quasi-judicial forum for a pregnant teenager to demonstrate that she should be allowed to make the

2003]

FAGAN

26

that enough children had reached the threshold age to tolerate the mistakes of the
percentage who were granted the freedoms or responsibilities but who had not yet attained
the developmental capacity by that age to perform that function well. In other words,
“…legal policy facilitates the transition to adulthood through a series of bright line rules that
reflect society’s collective interest in young citizen’s healthy development to productive
adulthood.”87

B. A Brief History of the Doctrine of Diminished Culpability of Children
Establishing bright line thresholds for granting adult status and responsibility to
adolescents has worked less well in the realm of adult criminal responsibility.
An examination of early English laws reveal that below a certain age threshold,
usually age seven or so, children were considered to be incapable of criminal acts because
they were incapable of forming the necessary element of criminal intent.88 Although youth
was not a complete excuse for criminal acts, the tender age of an offender often provided
grounds for the commutation or elimination of punishment.89 At the same time, for children
aged seven and higher, there was a rebuttable presumption of incapacity. Generally, in
early American colonial history, the burden was on the prosecution to overcome this
presumption, however no exact standard of proof ever emerged.90 Various courts over
time had used differing terminology in their attempt to measure a child’s culpability,
including having “a guilty knowledge,”91 “fully aware of the nature and consequences of the
act,”92 “plainly showed intelligent malice”93 and “mentally capable of distinguishing between
right and wrong.”94
By 1825, the first refuge was opened where children served sentences in a separate
institution from adults..95 Nonetheless, the juvenile justice system had not yet been

abortion decision without involving her parents, and is a central element of abortion regulation. In that
context, Professor Scott notes the burdensome procedural requirements that create social and
administrative costs involving parental notification and multiple visits, with little evidence that the
welfare of adolescents is advanced through the creation of such an intermediate category of
responsibility. Id .at 558.
87 Id at 577.
88 4 W. Blackstone, COMMENTARIES OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 23-24 (1792); 1 M. Hale, PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 25-28 (1682).
89 Kean, The History of the Criminal Liability of Children, 53 L.Q.REV.364 (1937).
90 Godfrey v. State, 31 Ala. 323 (1858).
91
Watson v. Commonwealth, 247 Ky. 336, 57 S.W.2d 39 (1933)
92
Martin v. State, 90 Ala. 602, 80 So. 858 (1891)
93
Miles v. State, 99 Miss. 165, 54 So. 946 (1911)
94 Id.
95 David Rothman, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE (1980); Anthony Platt, CHILD SAVERS
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established and children were still processed through the adult criminal court system.96
Eventually, parental neglect began to be recognized as one of the causes of juvenile
delinquency and destitution; this discovery animated the idea that children were to be
reformed and not punished.97
Beginning in 1899, Illinois began a nation-wide legislative movement that
established separate jurisdiction for juvenile courts. The Juvenile Court institutionalized into
law and procedure the notion that children who broke the law lacked the skills and maturity
of adults, and that rehabilitative services could restore them toward maturity and a
functional adult life.98 The new juvenile courts built a jurisprudence and institutional
structure around this new jurisprudence.99 By the time the federal government passed the
juvenile court act in 1938,100 there existed a separate and distinct formalized judicial forum

(1969)
96 Rothman, Id. at 10.
97
Platt, Id.
98
See, for example, Lamar Empey, The Progressive Legacy and the Concept of Childhood, in
JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE PROGRESSIVE LEGACY A ND CURRENT REFORMS 3 (1979), David Rothman,
Rothman, The Progressive Legacy: Development of American Attitudes Towards Juvenile
Delinquency, in JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE PROGRESSIVE LEGACY A ND CURRENT REFORMS 34 (1979); Julian
Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909). The creation of the juvenile courts modernized
and institutionalized the notion of immaturity inherent in the infancy defense, See, Andrew Walkover,
The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REV. 503, 510-12 (1984)
99
In separating child from adult offenders, the juvenile court system also rejected the
jurisprudence and procedure of adult criminal prosecutions. Courtroom procedures were modified to
eliminate any implication of a criminal proceeding; a euphemistic vocabulary and a physically separate
court building were introduced to avoid the stigma of adult prosecutions. To avoid stigmatizing a
youth, hearings were confidential, access to court records limited, and children were found to be
delinquent rather than guilty of committing a crime. Juvenile court proceedings concentrated on the
child’s background and welfare rather than the details surrounding the commission of a specific crime.
See, for exa mple, Anthony Platt, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (2d ed.) (1969);
President's Comm'n On Law Enforcement And Admin. Of Justice, Task Force Report: Juvenile
Delinquency And Youth Crime 92-93 (1967). The Juvenile Court movement rejected the punitive regime
of the adult criminal justice system, favoring a flexible system where the court intervened
paternalistically to identify the causes of delinquency and target services to cure these problems. By
rejecting the formality of the adult courts, the Juvenile Court also made the proceedings confidential so
as not to socially stigmatize young offender, excluded juries and lawyers from juvenile court
proceedings, and rejected the rules of evidence and formal procedures for confronting witnesses.
100
18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5037. Prior to 1938, there was no federal legislation providing for special
treatment for juveniles. In 1938, the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act was passed with the essential
purpose of keeping juveniles apart from adult criminals. The original legislation provided juveniles with
certain important rights including the right not to be sentenced to a term beyond the age of twentyone. This early law also provided that an individual could be prosecuted as a juvenile delinquent only
if the Attorney General in his discretion so directed. The 1938 Act gave the Attorney General the
option to proceed against juvenile offenders as adults or as delinquents except with regard to those
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and procedure for youthful offenders in every state.101 Even after the 1967 U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Gault allocated procedural rights to juveniles,102 including the right to
counsel, the Court narrowly defined these rights to the judicial fact-finding hearing,
continued to embrace the unique procedures for treating juveniles separately from adults,
and rejected the right to a jury trial for juveniles.103
Despite the juvenile court’s flexibility in determining the causes of misconduct and
its individualization of punishment, some juveniles were expelled from the juvenile court and
their cases were transferred to criminal court, an act that attached the assumption of
culpability to the adolescent offender and exposed them to criminal punishments.104 These
expulsions created a categorical status of adult culpability for those juvenile offenders. The
expulsion – actually a waiver or transfer process – offered a method for the juvenile court
to decide which adolescent offenders were sufficiently blameworthy to face adult
punishment. These juveniles were deemed culpable as adults if their characters and
behaviors merited the harsher conditions of punishment traditionally reserved for adults.105
In Kent v. United States, the Supreme Court reviewed its first juvenile case.106
Although the Kent decision preserved the waiver of juveniles into adult court, it also
created a different standard of procedural reliability and fairness in juvenile cases. Kent
held that children were entitled to representation by counsel, a hearing, and access to the
information upon which the wavier decision was based, including a statement of the reasons
supporting the transfer. In addition, the Kent Court set out a series of factors that the
juvenile court judge was required to consider in making a waiver determination: the
seriousness and type of offense; the manner in which the crime was committed; the maturity

allegedly committing offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment. The Juvenile Delinquency Act
was amended in 1948, with few substantive changes.
101 Steven L. Schlossman, LOVE AND THE A MERICAN DELINQUENT : THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF PROGRESSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE, 1825-1920 (1977).
102
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1967)
103
Id at 13 and 22. See, also, Barry C. Feld, Other than the Fact of a Prior Conviction”:
Apprendi, Sentence Enhancements based on Delinquency Adjudications, and the Quality of Justice
in Juvenile Courts. M INN. L. REV. (in press).
104
Scott, Legal Construction of Adolescence, supra note 79. See, also, David S. Tanenhaus,
The Evolution of Transfer Out of the Juvenile Court, in CHANGING BORDERS OF A DOLESCENCE (Jeffrey
Fagan and Franklin E. Zimring, eds.) 13 (2000); Franklin Zimring, The Punitive Necessity of Waiver, in
CHANGING BORDERS OF A DOLESCENCE, Id at 207; Fagan and Zimring, Editors’ Introduction, CHANGING
BORDERS OF A DOLESCENCE, Id at 1.
105 Franklin E. Zimring, THE CHANGING LEGAL W ORLD OF A DOLESCENCE (1981); Barry C. Feld,
BAD KIDS : RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT (1999); David S. Tanenhaus, The
Evolution of Transfer Out of the Juvenile Court, in CHANGING BORDERS OF A DOLESCENCE, Id at 13;
Franklin Zimring, The Punitive Necessity of Waiver, in CHANGING BORDERS OF A DOLESCENCE, Id at 207;
Fagan and Zimring, Editors’ Introduction, CHANGING BORDERS OF A DOLESCENCE, id at 1.
106 Kent v. United States, 383 US 542 (1966).
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of the juvenile; the upbringing, home situation and lifestyle of the juvenile; his or her record
and history and the possibility of rehabilitating the youth; and, concerns regarding the
protection of the public.107 Thus, the Court’s initial protection of juveniles was weakened
where after considering mitigating and aggravating circumstances, a court was nonetheless
allowed to subject juveniles to the very same punishments as adults.
Following Kent, nearly every state has either lowered the age at which juveniles can
be transferred to the juvenile court, or redistributed discretion to effect such waivers or
transfers from judge to prosecutors on a case-by-case basis108 or to legislatures via
statutory exclusion,109 or pursued both paths to criminalizing delinquency. Under current
statutes, the states assign criminal liability to wrongdoing at no more than age 18, and most
mark the age of responsibility at even younger ages for specific crimes. 110 For some
offenses and offenders, the threshold drops as low as 13 years of age in New York and 14
in California.111
The categorical status of juveniles as culpable adults obscures the developmental
realities of adolescence. Many commentators have noted the difficulty and social costs of
this interstitial regime, and suggested a range of alternative standards and strategies for

107 Id.
108
Robert O. Dawson, Judicial Waiver in Theory and Practice, in CHANGING BORDERS OF
A DOLESCENCE, Id at 45. See, also, Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense:
Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 473-78 (1987).
109
Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: A
History and Critique, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF A DOLESCENTS TO
THE CRIMINAL COURT (Jeffrey Fagan and Franklin E. Zimring, eds.) 83 (2000).
110
Patricia Torbet, Richard Gable, Hunter Hurst IV, Imogene Montgomery, Linda Szymanski,
Douglas Thomas.. State Responses to Serious and Violent Juvenile Crime: Research Report.
Washington, D.C.: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, National Center for Juvenile
Justice (1996).
111
See, for example, New York Juvenile Offender Law, enacted in 1978, mandates that 14 and
15 year olds indicted for any one of 15 felony offenses – ‘JO eligible offenses’ – and 13 year olds
indicted for homicide, are excluded from family court and processed in criminal court. See, Merrill
Sobie, The Juvenile Offender Act: Effectiveness and Impact on the New York Juvenile Justice System.
26 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW 677 (1981). See, also, See, California Welfare and Institutions
Code Section 707(a)(2), expanding the list of serious charges that will “automatically transfer” a
juvenile who is over 14 years old to criminal court. Moreover, Section 18 lowers the age requirement
for automatic transfers from 16 to 14, further increasing the number of juveniles who will be transferred
to criminal court without any judicial determination. This expansion ultimately shifts the power to
determine which court will judge an accused from the judge to the prosecutor, who has the
unreviewable discretion to select the charge. For example, if the prosecutor charges manslaughter, the
juvenile stays in the juvenile justice system; if the prosecution charges murder, the same conduct gets
tried in criminal court.
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conferring adult responsibility on adolescents who violate the criminal law.112 But the reality
of these laws is to expose a broad range of juveniles ages 16 and above to the option of
capital punishment in cases of homicide.

C. Jurisprudence of the Juvenile Death Penalty
Executions of youths below the age of 18 in (what eventually became) the United
States were recorded in the earliest colonial times.113 The number of executions remained
very low until the resumption of executions following Furman114 in 1973. By 2002, at least
365 individuals in the U.S. had been executed for crimes they committed when they were
juveniles, dating back to the first execution in 1642.115 Twenty-one of these 365
executions for juvenile crimes have been carried out during the current era (1973-2002),
2.6% of the total of 820 executions during this period.116 Almost two-thirds of the recent
executions of juvenile offenders have occurred in Texas, with no other jurisdiction in the
world actively involved in this practice.117 A total of 224 juvenile death sentences have been
imposed since 1973, with Texas, Florida and Alabama accounting for half of them.118 Of
these, 80 remain currently in force and still being litigated.119 Of the other 144 sentences
finally resolved, 21 (15%) have resulted in execution and 123 (85%) have been reversed or

112

Franklin E. Zimring and Jeffrey Fagan, Transfer Policy and Law Reform, in THE CHANGING
BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF A DOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT , Id. at 407, 408-413.
See, also, Scott, Legal Construction of Adolescence, supra n. 68, at 581-586.
113 Robert D. Hale, A REVIEW OF JUVENILE EXECUTIONS IN A MERICA (1997). The first recorded
execution of a juvenile (below age 18 at the time of execution) was in 1642, by the Massachusetts Bay
Colony. The last occurred in 1957. Between those dates, 331 juveniles were executed. Juvenile
executions reached unprecedented high numbers in the fifty years immediately following the Civil War.
114

408 US 238 (1972). By 1967, the federal courts had imposed a prohibition on capital
punishment so that a series of challenges to the principles and procedures could be decided.. In
Furman, the court ruled that state laws that delegated to the jury the choice of execution or
imprisonment for specific crimes without any clear guidelines were unconstitutional. States began
passing laws that complied with Furman in 1973, culminating in the decision in Gregg v. Georgia (428
US 153 (1976)), which found that a jurisprudence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the
commission of murders as weighed by the jury were acceptable structures for guiding a jury in the
choice of death or imprisonment. See, Franklin E. Zimring, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 8,9 (2003).
115 Victor L. Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death Sentences and Executions for
Juvenile Crimes, January 1, 1973 – June 30, 2002. Available at http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib.
116
Id
117
Id
118
Id
119
Id
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commuted.120 Among the 38 death penalty states, 19 set the minimum age at 16years, 6 at
age 17, and 13 set the age at 18.121
In practice, the execution of juveniles is either formally prohibited or a rare
occurrence,122 a pattern acknowledging that young offenders are not fully responsible for
their crimes, at least not to the extent of deserving the ultimate punishment.123 The
constitutionality of such a penalty, however, has come before the U.S. Supreme Court
several times in recent years, most notably in the 1980s in Eddings v. Oklahoma,124
Thompson v. Oklahoma,125 and Stanford v. Kentucky.126 The U.S. Supreme Court has
not revisited this question since Stanford and the constitutionality of applying the death
penalty to juvenile offenders appears to be settled.
Using Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, arguments were made in Eddings,
Thompson and Stanford that, given the reduced culpability and capacity of juveniles, their
execution was unconstitutionally harsh under the “Cruel and Unusual” clause. In his
plurality opinion in Thompson, Justice Stevens focused on the immature judgment of
adolescents in explaining why juvenile executions violate the principle of proportionality
under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment:

120

Id
In 2002, Indiana became the most recent state to raise the minimum age for death penalty
eligibility to eighteen. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3 (2002).
122
Id. See discussion of state statutes regulating juvenile death penalty in Thompson v.
Oklahoma (487 U.S. 815 (1988) and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). It is interesting to note
that only a handful of other countries authorize the execution of juveniles.
123
For a brief period in the early 20th century in the U.S., social and legal responses to
homicides committed by adolescents were dramatically different compared to the contemporary
American landscape of automatic transfer to the criminal court for adolescents charged with homicide
and eligibility for capital punishment at age 16. See, Franklin E. Zimring, American Youth Violence
(2000). Historical research by Professors David Tanenhaus and Steven Drizin revealed that sixty
juvenile homicide offenders in Chicago from 1900 to 1930 were exonerated by the Coroner's Jury. David
S. Tanenhaus and Steven A. Drizin, Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Accused: The Changing Legal
Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 653 (2002). The vast majority of
these cases (52, or 83 percent) involved either a child or adolescent shooting somebody "accidentally"
with a handgun. In verdicts, the coroner's juries often voiced their concerns about the availability of
guns. Id at 654. Tanenhaus and Drizin quote criticisms of the early twentieth century social reformer
Jane Addams of the easy availability of guns as a reaction to the frequency of juvenile gun homicides:
"…[t]here is an entire series of difficulties directly traceable to the foolish and adventurous persistence
of carrying loaded firearms," …"this tale could be duplicated almost every morning; what might be
merely a boyish scrap is turned into tragedy because some boy has a revolver." Jane Addams, THE
SPIRIT OF YOUTH AND THE CITY STREETS 60-61 (1909), quoted by Tanenhaus and Drizin, Id at 653.
124 455 US 104 (1982)
125 487 US 815 (1988)
126 492 US 361 (1989)
121
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[L]ess culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to
a comparable crime committed by an adult. The basis of this conclusion is
too obvious to require extensive explanation. Inexperience, less intelligence
and less education make a teenager less able to evaluate the consequences
of his or her conduct while at the same time he or she is more apt to be
motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult. The reasons
that juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an
adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally
reprehensible as that of an adult.127
In deciding Eighth Amendment cases, the U.S. Supreme Court applies a three part
test requires that a) the original framers of the Constitution understood the punishment to be
cruel and unusual; b) a societal consensus exists that the punishment offends civilized
standards of human decency; and c) the punishment is either (i) grossly disproportionate to
the severity of the crime or (ii) makes no measurable contribution to the accepted goals of
punishment.128 This claim about the harshness of the death penalty for juveniles is a
proportionality claim: juveniles (and mentally retarded persons) should be exempted from
execution because they categorically lack the degree of culpability necessary for the courts
to invoke the ultimate sanction according to contemporary community standards.129 That
is, the Court’s jurisprudence beginning with Furman relied on a narrowing requirement that
justified the imposition of a death penalty on a defendant based on his or her culpability
relative to others found guilty of murder.130 In the cases below, the threads of this
proportionality argument are briefly examined.

127

487 U.S. 815 at 835
128 See, for example, Gregg, supra n. 4; Coker, supra n. 5; Enmund, supra n. 7.
129 Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker, ABA’s Proposed Moratorium: Defending Categorical
Exemptions to the Death Penalty: Reflections on the ABA’s Resolutions Concerning the Execution of
Juveniles and Persons with Mentally Retardation, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB . 89, 91 (1998).
130 See, for example, Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). In Woodson (428 U.S. 280
(1976)), for example, the Court used its ability to regulate the administration of the death penalty to
narrow its use to those cases where the circumstances warrant such a severe punishment. In effect,
the Court created a category of criminals that were so beyond rehabilitation and humanity that the only
appropriate punishment would be that which is final and severe while also bolstering the illusion of a
system of heightened procedural scrutiny that the public can be assured that only criminals who truly
deserve the death penalty will be subject to it. See, Woodson, Id at 305.
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1. Eddings v. Oklahoma
Monty Lee Eddings was sixteen years old when he was found guilty of the firstdegree murder of an Oklahoma Highway Patrolman. In Eddings v. Oklahoma, the Court
initially granted certiorari on the sole question of whether the execution of a child who was
sixteen at the time of the crime constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.131 An “eleventh hour claim” was presented to the Supreme Court on behalf
of the petitioner, asking whether the Court should review the trial court’s refusal to consider
mitigating evidence – a practice which violated the holding in Lockett v. Ohio.132 This
“eleventh hour claim” ultimately formed the basis for the decision, attracting the five votes
necessary to reverse and remand Eddings’ death sentence. 133 Thus, the Court avoided
deciding the substantive age issue by vacating the defendant’s death sentence on procedural
grounds. Further, Justice O’Connor’s separate concurring opinion distinctly stated that
Eddings decision was not intended to resolve whether the imposition of the death penalty
on juveniles is a constitutional practice.. The language in Eddings, however, has become
significant as the Court instructed that the chronological age of a juvenile offender is an
important factor that must be considered in death penalty cases.134 After a few years, the
Court returned to the specific issue of the constitutionality.

2. Thompson v. Oklahoma
After a few years, the Court returned to the specific issue of the constitutionality in
Thompson v. Oklahoma.135 In Thompson, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that

131 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 US 104 (1982)
132 438 U.S. 586, 98 S. Ct. 2954 (1978) Lockett argued that the statute was unconstitutional due
to the fact that it does not allow the sentencing judge to consider mitigating factors in capital cases,
which is required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The decision was seven and one-half to
one-half. Chief Justice Burger announced the opinion of the Court, concurrences were by Justices
Blackmun and Marshall, Justice Rehnquist in part concurred and in part dissented, and Justice Brennan
opted not to participate. The Court also noted that a law which prohibits one from considering
mitigating factors creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed, when in fact the crime may call
for a lesser penalty. “The Ohio death penalty statute does not permit the type of individualized
consideration of mitigating factors required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id.
133 Eddings, supra n. 109, at 120 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
134 The Court concluded that “[y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and
condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.
Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years,
generally are less mature and responsible than adults.” Id, at 115.
135 487 US 815 (1988). Decision announced by Stevens and joined by Brennan, Marshall and

2003]

FAGAN

34

imposing the death penalty on a defendant who was fifteen years old at the time of his crime
was unconstitutional under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth
Amendment. At fifteen, William Wayne Thompson participated in the murder of his
brother-in-law who had a history of abusing the boy’s sister. In a 5-3 decision, the Court
vacated Thompson’s death sentence. Relying on the positions taken by professional
organizations and foreign nations, the majority found that “it would offend civilized
standards of decency to execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the time of his
or her offense.”136 As evidence of changing societal attitudes, the Court noted that since
the 1940s, juries infrequently imposed the death penalty on young offenders, stating:
The road we have traveled during the past four decades – in which
thousands of juries have tried murder cases – leads to the unambiguous
conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty on a 15-year-old
offender is now generally abhorrent to the consciousness of the
community.137
Reviewing American case history and an array of social scientific literature, the
Court documented the special treatment of children in the legal system. The Court
identified several different areas where the law treats juveniles differently from adults, areas
including the right to vote, right to serve on a jury, right to drive, right to marry, right to
purchase pornographic materials, and the right to participate in legalized gambling.138
Social science research cited in the opinion’s footnotes further elaborated upon the
characteristics of adolescence that contribute directly to the reduced culpability of juvenile
offenders. Footnote 43 in Thompson cited numerous sources that demonstrate the
reduced developmental abilities of children.139

Blackmun with O’Connor concurring in judgment.
136 Id. at 830.
137 Id. at 832.
138
Id at 823.
139 Id. at 835 (footnote 43). “Erik Erikson, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS 128-135 (1968)
(discussing adolescence as a period of "identity confusion," during which youths are "preoccupied
with what they appear to be in the eyes of others as compared with what they feel they are"); A.K.
Gordon, The Tattered Cloak of Immortality, in A DOLESCENCE AND DEATH 16, 27 (C. Corr & J. McNeil
eds. 1986) ("Risk-taking with body safety is common in the adolescent years, though sky diving, car
racing, excessive use of drugs and alcoholic beverages, and other similar activities may not be directly
perceived as a kind of flirting with death. In fact, in many ways, this is counterphobic behavior--a
challenge to death wherein each survival of risk is a victory over death"); Robert Kastenbaum, Time
and Death in Adolescence, in THE M EANING OF DEATH 99, 104 (Herman Feifel ed. 1959) ("The
adolescent lives in an intense present; 'now' is so real to him that past and future seem pallid by
comparison. Everything that is important and valuable in life lies either in the immediate life situation or
in the rather close future"); Lawrence Kohlberg, The Development of Children's Orientations Toward a
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The majority in Thompson also revived the discussion of the twin goals of the death
penalty elaborated upon in Gregg v. Georgia: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes
by future offenders.140 The Court rejected both the retribution and deterrence rationale in
Thompson. With regard to the retribution goal, the Court instructed that “[g]iven the lesser
culpability of the juvenile offender, the teenager’s capacity for growth, and society’s
fiduciary obligations to its children, the retributive value component of the Eighth
Amendment is simply inapplicable to the execution of a fifteen year old offender.”141
Relying on the three-part test, the majority in Thompson held that the execution of
individuals who were minors at the time of their crime is cruel and unusual punishment.142
However, the impact of the Thompson decision was restricted, however, by the
fact that only four justices reached the conclusion that the execution of a fifteen year old
was unconstitutional. Again, Justice O’Connor wrote a separate concurring opinion that
stopped short of recognizing a national consensus opposing the execution of juveniles.
Instead, O’Connor vacated the sentence on the grounds that there was a considerable risk
that the Oklahoma legislature did not consider the possibility that its death penalty statute
would apply to a fifteen-year-old death eligible.143 Thus, the practical effect of Thompson
was that the execution of a juvenile who had committed the crime prior to age 16 was
unconstitutional unless the State had proscribed a minimum age limit in its death penalty
legislation.

3. Stanford v. Kentucky
One year later, the Court was confronted with a similar issue as in Thompson,
Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri, but in these cases, the defendants were
sixteenand seventeen, respectively, when they committed their crimes.144 Stanford

Moral Order, 6 Vita Humana 11, 30 (1963) (studies reveal that "large groups of moral concepts and
ways of thought only attain meaning at successively advanced ages and require the extensive
background of social experience and cognitive growth represented by the age factor"); Derek H. Miller,
Adolescent Suicide: Etiology and Treatment, 9 Adolescent Psychiatry 327, 329 (S. Feinstein, J. Looney,
A. Schwartzberg, & A. Sorosky eds. 1981) (many adolescents possess a "profound conviction of their
own omnipotence and immortality. Thus many adolescents may appear to be attempting suicide, but
they do not really believe that death will occur"); Streib, supra n. 36, at 3-20, 184-189 ("The difference
that separates children from adults for most purposes of the law is children's immature, undeveloped
ability to reason in an adultlike manner").”
140 428 US 153 (1976).
141 Id. at 836.
142
Id at 815 and note 26.
143 Id. at 857. (O’Connor, concurring).
144 492 US 361 (1989) (Stanford and Wilkins cases were consolidated) Decision announced
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involved the rape, sodomy and shooting murder of a twenty year old gas station attendant
by petitioner Kevin Stanford when he was seventeen years and four months old. Wilkins
involved the stabbing death of a convenience store worker during the commission of a
robbery by Heath Wilkins when he was approximately sixteen years and sixmonths of age.
In these decisions, the Court expressly held that the imposition of the death penalty on
defendants aged 16 or 17 at the commission of their crime was not unconstitutional.
In deciding the case, Justice Scalia reviewed each of the arguments set forth in
Thompson. Rejecting the international comparisons made in Thompson, the majority
emphasized, “it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive.”145 The Court
reviewed past and current legislative developments and found the petitioners in both cases
did not meet their burden to establish an adequate basis to find a national consensus against
the juvenile death penalty. In response to the majority’s argument in Thompson – that the
behavior of juries indicated disapproval of the execution of children – the majority in
Stanford held that the infrequent application of capital punishment is indicative of the
prosecutors’ and juries’ beliefs that capital punishment should rarely be imposed, not
never.
As a final point, the Court held that there was no basis for comparison between the
imposition of capital punishment on juveniles and laws regulating other realms of juvenile
legal responsibility. Citing Lockett v. Ohio,146 the Court explained:
It is, to begin with, absurd to think that one must be mature enough to
drive carefully, to drink responsibly, or to vote intelligently, in order to be
mature enough to understand that murdering another human being is
profoundly wrong, and to conform one’s conduct to that most minimal of
all civilized standards…These laws set the appropriate ages for the
operation of a system that makes its determination in gross, and that does
not conduct individualized maturity tests for each driver, drinker, or voter.
The criminal justice system, however, does provide individualized testing.
In the realm of capital punishment in particular, ‘individualized
consideration is a constitutional requirement’.147
Accordingly, in Stanford, the majority relied upon the procedural safeguards
developed through the thread of death penalty jurisprudence following Furman to protect
defendants from the arbitrary and discriminatory application of capital punishment. The
Stanford court argued that the capacity determination regarding adolescents and deterrence

by Scalia and joined by Rehnquist, White, O’Connor and Kennedy
145 Id. at 369, note 1. (emphasis in original).
146
438 US 586, 605 (1978).
147 Id. at 374.
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had already been completed, and thus all other constitutional claims related to capacity had
been addressed.148 In other words, those less culpable were filtered out earlier in the
course of trial and hence were not exposed to the possibility of a death sentence at the
lower standard of blameworthiness. The danger in this approach is that the role of
procedural due process is conflated with the deliberation required for substantive factual
determinations such as maturity or culpability, and the result would be an incomplete
examination of the substantive constitutional issues underlying the application of the death
penalty on juveniles. The mere fact that procedural due process was met does not
automatically lead to the conclusion that the substantive issues have been settled.
Although the Thompson and Stanford Courts recognized that children are
incomplete decision makers, judgmentally immature and unable to fully regulate all of their
behavior, the precedent in Stanford is based heavily on procedural dimensions - not
substantive considerations about the capacities or blameworthiness of juveniles at any age.
This perspective sustains today’s climate that permits capital punishment of children ages
sixteen or seventeen. However, Atkins creates a competing precedent that opposes the
imposition of capital punishment when defendants have diminished culpability, a return to
the jurisprudential perspective that places primacy on substantive considerations of reduced
culpability, capacity and understanding.

D. Decomposing the Culpability of Juveniles
In much of criminal law doctrine, punishment determinations require a easurement
of the wrong that is done and the blameworthiness of the individual.149 Common law
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Thompson, at 2969-70.
See, generally, Robert Nozik, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS (1981); George Fletcher, BASIC
CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT (1996); Richard J. Bonnie et al, CRIMINAL LAW (1997). In his chapter
“Retributive Punishment," Nozick articulates a formulaic approach for establishing proportionality of
punishment in a retributivist society.. His basic algorithm is that P(punishment) = r (responsibility) * H
(wrongness of act). For example, under retributive punishment for S's act A:
(1) Someone believes that S's act A has a certain degree of wrongness; (2) and visits a penalty
upon S; (3) which is determined by the wrongness H of the act A, or by r * H; (4) intending that the
penalty be done b/c of the wrong act A; (5) and in virtue of the wrongness of the act A; (6) intending
that S know the penalty was visited upon him because he did A; (7) and in virtue of the wrongness of
A; (8) by someone who intended to have the penalty fit and be done because of the wrongness of A;
(9) and who intended that S would recognize (he was intended to recognize) that the penalty was
visited upon him so that 1-8 are satisfied, indeed so that 1-9 are satisfied.
Nozick extends this doctrine in several ways. First, he points out that in many cases a
wrongdoer's punishment includes other costs (compensating the victim, confronting wrongness of his
act, etc)--these are proxied by c. In this case, P = (r * H) - c. Second, Nozick points to the teleological
149
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assumes that children are immature, and because of that immaturity, they are less
blameworthy than adults, so the punishments for their crimes should be proportionately less
than those for a fully competent adult.150 Distinguishing the immature adolescent from the
mature offender who is fully responsible for his or her crimes requires a careful examination
of the developmental capacities and processes that are relevant to both adolescent criminal
choices and the ways in which immaturity mitigates responsibility.151
The most critical difference between adolescents and adults, whether in crime or in
choices involving everyday social or personal behaviors, is that teenagers are less
competent decision makers than adults.152 Their judgment is immature because they have
not yet attained several dimensions of psychosocial development that characterize adults as

notions of retributivis m that aim at “matching punishment.” This rests on the notion that punishment
should aim to inform or alert S of the wrongness of A. This is an “optimistic hypothesis about what
another person will or can come to know” and suggests a major problem when S is incapable of
learning or realizing that his act was wrong to the same r that an average person would. Juveniles and
mentally defective individuals are arguably susceptible to this effect.
Third, capital punishment generally should be reserved for those truly monstrous cases (he
mentions Hitler) b/c if we are to be connected to S's value (the value of the wrongness of his act and
the attempt to show him its significance through punishment), killing S would nullify any attempt at
matching punishment.
Finally, he touches briefly on defining r and H, specifically. He reaches no concrete
conclusions in this regard but does illustrate the need to have them defined by separate and distinct
characteristics, so as to avoid circularity. Indeed, it is often difficult to separate the seriousness of the
offense (H) and the responsibility (r) that the perpetrator should have with regard to it. Most
importantly Nozick contends that r is best defined as the degree to which S flouts correct values, and
that if defects in character contributes to this flouting, there is less flouting than there appeared to be,
and r is consequentially decreased.
Nozick's framework illustrates that punishment is (or ought to be) a product of harm and
culpability, the latter being vulnerable to mitigating factors associated with being a juvenile, a mentally
retarded individual, or another person whose disabilities constitute a cascade of mitigators in the
jurisprudence of capital punishment. If the goal of this jurisprudence is to “ensure that only the most
deserving of execution are put to death,” (as Justice Stevens declared again in Atkins), then even a
slightly mitigated r value should bring the punishment (P) under this threshold.
150
Franklin Zimring, Penal Proportionality for the Young Offender, in YOUTH ON TRIAL (R.
Schwartz and T. Grisso, eds.) 207 (2000).
151
Elizabeth S. Scott and Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 800 (2002).
See, also Jeffrey Fagan, Context and Culpability of Adolescent Violence, 6 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 507,
535-38 (discussing how choices to engage or reject criminal activity in specific event circumstances are
proscribed by the immediate contexts in which the choice is made, and how those choices differ for
adolescents in high versus low crime neighborhoods).
152
See Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 229-35 (1995) (describing developmental factors that contribute to immature
judgment); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescent Decision
Making , 20 Law & Hum. Behav 249 (1996) (describing domains of psychosocial development as
autonomy, perspective, and temperance).
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mature, including the capacity for autonomous choice, self-management, risk perception
and the calculation of future consequences.153 The attainment of these developmental
capacities is perhaps one reason why crime rates peak in late adolescence, but then
subsequently decline as adolescent development progresses toward maturity. 154
Notwithstanding the fact that different adolescents develop at different rates,
adolescence, generally, serves as a bridge between childhood and adulthood with regard to
developing psychosocial capacity. For example, cognitive capacities for reasoning and
understanding are well formed by mid-adolescence and approximate the skills shown by
most adults.155 But teens are less skilled in using these skills to make real-life decisions.156
Adolescents also mature more slowly in other areas that contribute to immature judgment
and the tendency of adolescents to make choices that are harmful to themselves or
others.157 Finally, adolescence is characterized by incomplete identity formation, a process
that – when mixed with poor judgment and decision-making – leads to exploration,
behavioral experimentation, and fluctuations in self-image.158 As psychologist Laurence
Steinberg shows, “[t]his movement, over the course of adolescence, from a fluid and
embryonic sense of identity to one that is more stable and well-developed is paralleled by
developments in the realms of morality, values, and beliefs.”159 That these three dimensions
of development render most adolescents immature - and therefore less than fully culpable
for their behaviors, whether they be criminal or conventional – reflects striking parallels with
the incompetencies of mentally retarded persons, should be obvious.

1. Understanding and Reasoning
Cognitive development – reasoning and understanding – among adolescents differs
substantially from adults. Basic skills, such as information processing, attention, short and

153

Steinberg and Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescent Decision Making , Id.
Robert J. Sampson and John H. Laub, Understanding Desistance from Crime, 28 Crime and
Justice 1, 46-48 (2001) (reviewing literature on the robust finding that crime peaks in late adolescence
and declines for most persons sharply during developmental transitions from adolescence to
adulthood).
155
Steinberg and Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescent Decision Making , supra
note 151.
156
S. Ward and W. Overton. (1990). Semantic familiarity, relevance, and the development of
deductive reasoning. DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 26, 488-493.
157
Elizabeth Scott, Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making, supra note 152; Elizabeth S. Scott
and Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice
Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 165-66 (1997)
158
Laurence D. Steinberg, A DOLESCENCE (6th ed. 2002)
159
Id.
154

FAGAN

2003]

40

long-term memory, and organization, are acquired steadily through adolescence.160
Although social science evidence suggests that adolescents’ capacities for understanding
and reasoning in making decisions roughly approximate those of adults by midadolescence, most of the research leading to these conclusions was done in unstressful and
decontextualized laboratory situations.161 It is uncertain whether these results would obtain
in ambiguous situations, or be the same under arousal in unstructured settings where peer
dynamics have strong influence on adolescent choices. Scott and Steinberg conclude that
the empirical evidence is uncertain whether adolescent cognitive capacity as it affects
choices relevant to criminal conduct is comparable to that of adults.162

2. Judgment Factors in Decision-making
Even when adolescent cognitive capacities approximate the levels of adults, other
developmental dimensions that progress more slowly lead to immature judgment and poor
decision-making. The psychosocial factors most relevant to differences in judgment
include: (a) peer orientation, (b) attitudes toward and perception of risk, (c) temporal
perspective, and (d) capacity for self-management.163 “Whereas cognitive capacities shape
the process of decision-making, immature judgment can affect outcomes, because these
developmental factors influence adolescent values and preferences, that in turn drive the
cost-benefit calculus in the making of choices.”164
Parents and developmental psychologists have both long known that adolescents
are more responsive to peer influence than are adults, that these influences are greatest in
mid-adolescence and that they decline slowly during the high school years.165 Peer
influence affects adolescent judgment both directly and indirectly. In some contexts,
adolescents might make choices in response to direct peer pressure. Adolescents’ desire
for peer approval affects their choices, even without direct coercion. Future orientation is

160

See, for example, Daniel P. Keating, Adolescent Thinking, in A T THE THRESHOLD: THE
DEVELOPING A DOLESCENT 54 (S. Shirley Feldman & Glen R. Elliott eds. 1990).
161
The claim is tentative because it is supported by a group of small research studies
conducted in laboratory settings that for the most part involved white middle class subjects and no
adult control groups. Tasks often are artifactual, and are not performed under conditions of stress or
arousal that are typical of the situations in which adolescents often find themselves when they must
decide to engage in a criminal act. Scott and Steinberg, supra n. 129, at 813-814; see Gardner, Asserting
Scientific Authority: Cognitive Development and Adolescent Legal Rights, 44 Am. Psychologist 895
(1989). See, also, Jeffrey Fagan, Context and Culpability in Adolescent Crime, supra note 151.
162
Scott and Steinberg, id at 151.
163
Scott and Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra n. 151; Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 133.
164
Scott and Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra n. 151.
165
B. Bradford Brown, Peer Groups and Peer Cultures, in A T THE THRESHOLD: THE
DEVELOPING A DOLESCENT 171 (S. Shirley Feldman & Glen R. Elliott eds. 1990).
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the extent to which individuals consider both long-term and short-term consequences of
their actions in making choices. Compared to adults, adolescents tend to telescope the
future, placing it farther into the background of decision making than do adults, while at the
same time disproportionately weighing the short term consequences of decisions - both
risks and benefits - in making choices.166
Adolescents also perceive and weigh risk differently from adults.167 Adolescents
take more risks with health and safety than do older adults, such as unprotected sex, 168
drunk driving169 and other illegal behaviors.170 Peer influence interacts with risk taking:
empirical evidence shows that people generally make riskier decisions in groups than they
do alone.171 Adolescents seem to be less risk averse than adults because they overstate
rewards while underestimating risks.172
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Steinberg and Cauffman, supra n. 155; Scott and Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra n. 151,
citing See William Gardner & Janna Herman, Adolescents’ AIDS Risk Taking: A Rational Choice
Perspective, in A DOLESCENTS IN THE A IDS EPIDEMIC 24 (William Gardner et al. eds., 1990). Scott and
Steinberg cite several explanations for this age gap in future orientation. “First, owing to cognitive
limitations in their ability to think in hypothetical terms, adolescents simply may be less able than
adults to think about events that have not yet occurred (i.e., events that may occur sometime in the
future). Second, weaker future orientation of adolescents may reflect their more limited life experience.
For adolescents, a consequence five years off may seem very remote; they may simply attach more
weight to short term consequences because they seem more salient to their lives. How far out in time
individuals are able to project events may be proportionate to their age; ten years represents one-fifth
of the lifespan for someone who is 50, but two-thirds for someone who is 15.” See William Gardner, A
Life-Span Rational-Choice Theory of Risk Taking, in A DOLESCENT RISK TAKING ,78-79, (Nancy J. Bell
& Robert W. Bell eds., 1993).
167
See Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking in Adolescence: A Decision-Making
Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 1, 1-2 (1992) (presenting a rational-decisionmaking model of
adolescent risky behavior).
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Gardner and Herman, supra note 142.
169
Furby and Beyth-Marom, supra note 167.
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See, for example, Alida Benthin, Paul Slovic, et al., Adolescent Health-Threatening and
Health-Enhancing Behaviors: A Study of Word Association, in Paul Slovic, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK
(2000).
171
Scott and Steinberg, supra n. 151.
172
Steinberg and Cauffman, supra n.153 Scott and Steinberg note that this may relate in part
to limits on youthful time perspective; taking risks is more costly for those with a stake in the future.
Finally, adolescents may have different values and goals than do adults, that lead them to calculate
risks and rewards differently. For example, the danger of risk taking could constitute a reward for an
adolescent but a cost to an adult. Moreover, peer rejection is likely to be weighed more heavily in
adolescent than adult choices. For instance, whereas an adult might simply weigh the pleasant effects
of experimenting with an illicit drug against criminal apprehension or potential health risks, an
adolescent might weigh the peer acceptance or rejection that might result from the choice. See, also,
L.L. Lopes, Between Hope and Fear: The Psychology of Risk, 20 A DVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC .
PSYCH. 255 (1987).
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Impulsivity and poor self-management also appear to be greater in adolescents than
in adults. Impulsivity increases between middle adolescence and early adulthood and
declines thereafter, as does sensation-seeking.173 Emotional regulation also is more erratic
among adolescents than adults,174 and adolescents may have more difficulty regulating their
moods, impulses, and behaviors than do adults.175
Some of the differences between adults and adolescents may reflect not just
psychosocial development, but also its underlying organic structure. The disjuncture
between physical maturity, and uneven maturity in different parts of the brain that regulate
different functions, creates an imbalance in adolescents that can adversely influence their
judgment and decision-making. Scott and Steinberg summarize this process as it pertains
to this developing area of research:
At puberty, changes in the limbic system B a part of the brain that is central
in the processing and regulation of emotion B may stimulate adolescents to
seek higher levels of novelty and to take more risks; and may contribute to
increased emotionality and vulnerability to stress. At the same time,
patterns of development in the prefrontal cortex, which is active during the
performance of complicated tasks involving planning and decision-making,
suggest that these higher-order cognitive capacities may be immature well
into middle adolescence. One scientist has likened the psychological
consequences of brain development in adolescence to “starting the engines
without a skilled driver”176

Recent studies suggest that there are functions and regions of the brain that regulate
long-term planning, regulation of emotion, impulse control, and the evaluation of risk and
reward continue to mature over the course of adolescence, and perhaps beyond age 20,
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Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 151.
Research on brain development, indicates that the organic bases of functions such longterm planning, regulation of emotion, impulse control, and the evaluation of risk and reward are not
fully mature by the end of adolescence. See, Patricia Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related
Behavioral Manifestations, 24 Neuroscience & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVIEWS 417 (2000) (reviewing animal
and human research on brain maturation during puberty and indicating that "remodelling of the brain"
during adolescence occurs among different species) (also cited in Scott and Steinberg, n. 71).
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See, for example, Reed Larson et al., Mood Variability and the Psycho-Social Adjustment
of Adolescents, 9 J. Youth & Adolescence 469, 488 (1980) (presenting a study finding wider mood
fluctuations among adolescents than adults) (cited in Scott and Steinberg, n. 70).
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Scott and Steinberg, supra n.151, citing Ronald Dahl, Affect Regulation, Brain
Development, and Behavioral/Emotional Health in Adolescence, 6 CNS SPECTRUMS 60 (2001).
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well into young adulthood.177 Functional brain imaging and postmortem studies suggest that
frontal lobes do not fully mature until young adulthood.178 This study compared MRI scans
of young adults, 23-30, with those of teens, 12-16. The researchers looked for signs of
myelin, which would imply more mature, efficient neural connections. Areas of the frontal
lobe showed the largest differences between young adults and teens. This increased
myelination in the adult frontal cortex likely relates to the maturation of cognitive processing
and other “executive” functions. Many other areas – those that mediate spatial, sensory,
auditory and language functions – already seemed mature in the teen brain. Instead, the
observed late maturation of the frontal lobe is characteristic of impaired “executive”
functioning.179
Another series of MRI studies suggest that teens may process emotions differently
than adults.180 Researchers at Harvard's McLean Hospital scanned subjects' brain activity
while they identified emotions on pictures of faces displayed on a computer screen.181
Young teens (below 14), who characteristically perform poorly on the task, activated the
amygdala, a brain center that mediates fear and other "gut" reactions, more than the frontal
lobe. As teens grow older, their brain activity during this task tends to shift to the frontal
lobe, leading to more reasoned perceptions and improved performance.182 Similarly, the
researchers saw a shift in activation as teens got older from the temporal lobe to the frontal
lobe during a language skills task. The studies were imprecise as to a “bright line” threshold
when frontal lobe activity dominated cognitive and emotional tasks, but the researchers did
note significant variability in the age at which these functional thresholds are achieved: some
teens reach this stage of “mature” (frontal lobe) functioning at 14, while many others have
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Spear, supra n. 175; See, also, Jay N. Giedd, Jonathan Blumenthal , Neal O. Jeffries, et al.
Brain development during child-hood and adolescence: a longitudinal MRI study. 2 Nature
Neuroscience 861, 861-3 (1999); Judith L.Rapoport, Jay N. Giedd, Jonathan Blumenthal et al.,
Progressive cortical change during adolescence in childhood-onset schizophrenia. A longitudinal
magnetic resonance imaging study. 56 A RCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 649, 652-54 (1999); Paul M.
Thompson, Jay N.Giedd, et al. , Growth patterns in the developing brain detected by using continuum
mechanical tensor maps. 404 NATURE 190-3 (2000); Avshalom Caspi, Terrie E. Moffitt, et al., Role of
Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated Children 297 SCIENCE 851-4 (2002).
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not yet reached it by age 20 or later into young adult years.183
Professor Ruben Gur concludes that brain maturation is not complete until about
age 21, with large variation in myelination in different regions of the brain, a marker of
uneven maturation in areas associated with cognitive and emotional function.184 Based on a
review of both experimental studies and both brain imaging and Magnetic Resonant Imaging
(MRI) analyses, Professor Gur explicitly links these brain regions to the control of
aggression and other impulses, the consideration of alternatives and consequences of
actions, impulsivity, judgment, planning for the future, foresight of consequences, and other
“mature thought processes” that make people morally culpable185 Professor Gur concludes
that there is no way to state with any scientific reliability that an individual 17-year old has a
fully matured brain, regardless of the precision of other psycho-social assessments at that
age. 186
This is a new and rapidly developing research area, where natural science
complements evidence from behavioral science regarding deficits and incompetencies in
adolescents that influence judgment, decision-making and emotional regulation. The
implication, then, is that there exists uneven development within the adolescent brain
regarding various functions, and this irregularity is also subject to significant variation
among adolescents in the age at which they attain organic brain developmental thresholds
that regulate the emotional and cognitive components of decision making and control. This
variation suggests that even at later stages of adolescence, and perhaps among some young
adults, there is a non-negligible percentage of people who are “immature” not just in their
psychosocial functioning but in the organic development that underlies it.
3. Development and Decision Making
The tendency of adolescents to commit crimes in groups is well known,187 although
the mechanisms of group dynamics and peer influence are not well understood.188
Changes in peer networks over time, and a diminution of the role of peers in both legal and
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antisocial behavior, also characterize the predictable patterns of desistance from crime that
occurs during the transition from adolescence to adulthood.189 Scott and Steinberg
conclude that the research on peer influence, risk preference, impulsivity, and future
orientation shows that these factors affect adolescent decision making in general, and are
equally likely to influence decisions to participate in crime.190
Research on the social contexts of adolescent interactions shows that these group
settings offer strong incentives for conformity and compliance, serving important
developmental functions such as the expression of autonomy and the construction of social
identity.191 Opportunities for crime are more abundant in settings where social controls are
weak, whether in the everyday world of adolescents or the unique and stressful settings of
inner cities where crime rates are highest.192 Adolescent peer orientation makes youths
who live in high-crime neighborhoods susceptible to powerful pressures to join in criminal
activity, and compliance may be both typical and perceived as necessary to avoid threats to
an adolescent’s personal safety. 193
In my studies on inner city violence in New York, I showed how social norms
within urban adolescent male subcultures prescribe a set of attitudes and behaviors that
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often lead to violent crime.194 Avoiding confrontation when challenged by a rival results in a
loss of social status and ostracism by peer affiliates, which itself can create vulnerability to
physical attack. Ordinary youths in poor urban neighborhoods face coercive peer pressure
and sometimes tangible threats that both propel them to get involved in crime and make
extrication difficult. Their limited ability to see beyond their immediate social and physical
world to the norms and institutions of the dominant society reflects not only their attenuated
psycho-social development and decision-making skills, but also the influence of their social
context, as well.195
For most adolescents, these characteristic developmental influences on decisionmaking will change in predictable ways as they mature. During the maturational journey to
adulthood, adolescents become better decision-makers as they grow out of their natural
susceptibility to peer influence, their risk perception improves, their computation of risk
becomes more balanced and longer in temporal perspective, and self-regulation evolves.196
These changes lead to changes in the calculus, and competency, of decision-making.197
“The adolescent becomes an adult who is likely to make different choices from his youthful
self, choices that reflect more mature judgment.”198 Imagine, then, the mentally retarded
person who cannot mature in this fashion and develop these competencies, and the basis
for extending the logic of Atkins to adolescents becomes transparent.
E. Development and the Jurisprudence of Culpability for Adolescents
The principle of penal proportionality leads to a determination of punishment that
combines the degree of harm of the act and the blameworthiness of the actor.199
Determining blameworthiness, whether in absolute or relative terms, is a process that draws
strength not just from normative or moral views, but from more complex and nuanced
judgments about exogenous factors that bear on culpability – both contextual factors that
bear on the incident itself or the circumstances in which the actor is situated, and
developmental factors related to emotional, cognitive and other psycho-social functions
residing within individuals.200 Some models of culpability are based on rationality and
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volition, embracing assumptions about the capacity to make rational choice.201 Actors
whose decisions are impaired are less culpable than those who are fully functional, as are
those whose choices are severely constrained by either circumstances or individual
(functional) limitations.202 Judgments about the degree of these limitations will determine if
the person is judged less culpable and deserving of a lesser punishment compared to the
fully functional defendant. These persons may be fully responsible but perhaps less than
fully culpable.
The existence of a separate system of juvenile justice, with its own language and
jurisprudence, expresses the normative view that adolescents are generally less
blameworthy than adults.203 Scott and Steinberg distinguish between the culpability of
adolescent offenders – which is mitigated by their developmental deficits – and their
responsibility for their behavior choices.204 In other words, adolescence as a
developmental status is mitigating but not exculpatory, they say.205 The developmental
deficits discussed earlier are not the deficits of an atypical adolescent, but are “normal”
developmental processes common to all adolescents. To the degree that there is variation
among adolescents, whether offenders or not, these differences are predictable and subject
to a variety of contextual, circumstantial and intra-individual factors. In this jurisprudence,
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the crimes of adolescents are a function of immaturity, compared to the crimes of adults,
which are the acts of morally responsible, yet possibly cognitively and emotionally deficient
actors.
This is not necessarily a question of the capacity of teenagers to understand the
harms they do and the consequences of their acts. Most development psychologists agree
that they do. Among adults, that type of incapacity might better describe mentally
disordered persons or some mentally retarded persons. Rather, this question considers
that it is immature and otherwise defective judgment that contributes to decisions by
adolescents, along with their inability to make judgments with the same skills and capacities
as adults, which reduces their culpability and blameworthiness. “Due to these
developmental influences, youths are likely to act more impulsively and to weigh the
consequences of their options differently from adults, discounting risks and future
consequences, and overvaluing (by adult lights) peer approval, immediate consequences,
and the excitement of risk taking. These influences are predictable, systematic and
developmental in nature (rather than an expression of personal values), and they undermine
decision making capacity in ways that are generally accepted as mitigating of culpability.”206
F. Development and Competence: The Danger of False Confessions
In Atkins, the Court noted “…[t]he risk that the death penalty will be imposed in
spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty, is enhanced…..by the possibility of
false confessions”.207 The same risks are evident in several recent cases where juveniles
falsely confessed to homicides during interrogations by police.208 Juvenile suspects have
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long been considered a population that is particularly vulnerable to coercion and false
confessions. Because of their underdeveloped though processes and immaturity, they are
less likely to understand their rights.209 The United States Supreme Court has also long

that these cases are concentrated among the mentally retarded). For a recent review of false
confessions in capital cases, see Welch S. White, Confessions in Capital Cases, 2003 ILLINOIS L.REV.
(forthcoming).
209
Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacity to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68
CAL. L. REV. 1134 (1980). A separate though related is sue is whether (or to what extent) the factors that
make a person less culpable might also make them less competent to stand trial. One might conclude
that the developmental deficits that render adolescents less culpable might also indicate that they lack
sufficient adjudicative competence – by virtue of their immaturity – to stand trial. There is empirical
evidence that younger adolescents perform more poorly than adults (and on a level similar to that of
mentally retarded adults) on tests of adjudicative competence. These differences are likely to have
been understated in this research, where tasks were performed in an artifactual laboratory setting rather
than in the more salient, arousing or threatening atmosphere of an actual court proceeding. See,
Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents’ and
Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 333 (2003). However, both law
and social science have noted that the skills required to participate effectively in one’s own defense
(for example, the ability to reason, to identify information of value to counsel, and to understand the
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Zimring, Penal Proportionality for the Young Offender: Notes on Immaturity, Capacity and
Diminished Responsibility, 267 YOUTH ON TRIAL (Thomas Grisso and Robert G. Schwartz, eds.) (2000)).
Accordingly, the dimensions of adjudicative competence – and whether a juvenile is “immature” by
these standards – only partially overlap with the dimensions of immaturity that comprise diminished
responsibility under death penalty jurisprudence. Only some of the factors that make an adolescent
less culpable might also make him or her less competent to stand trial.
The standards for adjudicative competence for juveniles were constructed in a series of cases
beginning in 1960 with Dusky v. United States (362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (holding
that the competence of a juvenile defendant depended on an assessment of “whether he has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and
whether he has rational as well as factual understanding of proceeding against him and it is not enough
that he is oriented to time and place and has some recollection of events”). In Drope v. Missouri, (420
U.S. 162, 171-172, 95 S.Ct. 896, 903-904, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975)), the U.S. Supreme Court broadened the
standards for adjudicative competence to include the right to testify on one's own behalf or to remain
silent without penalty for doing so.
Some states go so far as to include the term “immaturity” in setting a competency standard for
adolescents. See, FL, LA AK. A recent thread of cases also illustrates the increasing emphasis on
immaturity in determinations of juvenile’s competence to stand trial. See In re J.M. (769 A.2d 656
(Vermont 2001)), requiring that the “evaluation of a juvenile’s competency is to be made with regard to
juvenile [developmental] norms”; Carey v. Michigan (615 N.W.2d 742 (Michigan 2000) (requiring that
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Arkansas (21 S.W.3d 801 (Arkansas, 2000) (stating that competency evaluations should apply an “ageappropriate capacity standard to juveniles, which is different from adults”); In re Charles B.,
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recognized this particular vulnerability of juvenile offenders and has mandated safeguards in
the form of procedural due process for juveniles in police custody. 210 Given the emotional
and intellectual immaturity of minors, harsh police interrogation may seriously jeopardize the
reliability of a confession.
Experimental evidence from controlled studies and case autopsies show that
adolescents may be vulnerable to false confessions owing to their immaturity and its
concomitant factors: their suggestibility and their proneness to coercion.211 Juveniles
generally are more susceptible to suggestion, thus making them more likely to implicate
themselves in a crime or implicate themselves in a crime they did not commit. This often
results as a reaction to what a child would perceive as a threat from an authority figure.

‘incompetent’…because he lacks a present ability to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree
of rational understanding, and he does not have a rational and factual understanding of the proceeding
against him”).
So, the overlap in the components of immaturity that shape reduced culpability differ from
those that suggest that immaturity might reduce the adjudicative competence of adolescent defendants
in criminal court. Moreover, these factors have a complex interaction when considering adolescents’
competence to stand trial. Susceptibility to peer pressure, impulsivity, and poor emotional selfregulation, for example, reduce one’s culpability (consistent with the reasoning of Atkins), but play a
much lesser role in determining whether one is competent to stand trial because, presumably, counsel
is provided to ensure that legal decisions and strategies are not pursued impulsively and that the
defendant is not unduly pressured into a plea bargain or into self-incriminating testimony. By the same
token, however, these culpability-reducing factors are likely to influence behavior during interrogation
(when a suspect who is impulsive or susceptible to peer pressure might be tempted, for example, to
make a false confession) when counsel is not present. Such factors are thus important when
determining whether an individual is competent to waive Miranda rights. Accordingly, the
characteristics that indicate a lack of sufficient culpability to warrant execution (as cited in Atkins,
Thompson or Simmons) do not necessarily imply a lack of adjudicative competence.
210
See Gallegos v. Colorado, 82 S.Ct. 1209 (1962), and Haley v. Ohio, 332 S.Ct. 596 (1948). In
Gallegos, the Court recognized the limited ability of a minor to comprehend constitutional concepts:
"[A] 14 year old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to have any
conception of what will confront him when he is made accessible only to police.
That is to say, we deal with a person who is not equal to the police in knowledge
and understanding of the consequences of the questions and answers being
recorded and who is unable to know how to protect his own interests or how to get
the benefits of his constitutional rights." Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 54, 82 S.Ct. at 1212, 8
L.Ed.2d at 328.
In Haley, the Court made nearly identical statements about a male suspect who was 15 years
of age.
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Suggestibility is inversely related to intelligence,212 increasing their risk of susceptibility to
giving false confessions.213 In laboratory studies, adolescents with low intelligence were
much more susceptible to leading questions, confabulate more, and are more acquiescent
with interrogators.214 The more suggestible subjects are, the less accurate they are in
recalling details, and the more erroneous information is produced during interrogation.215
Low IQ subjects are more likely to believe that falsely confessing will have little or no
consequences, because of their knowledge of the truth of the matter and belief that truth
always wins out. This naiveté renders low functioning subjects at higher risk for falsely
confessing than normal functioning subjects. Combined with susceptibility to acquiescence,
suggestibility, compliance with authority, and proclivity to confabulate puts low IQ subjects
at significantly higher risk for false confession in context of a police interrogation.216 The
case autopsies by Professors Tanenhaus and Drizin217 show that aggressive police tactics
during interrogations of adolescents often produce confessions that later are proved false.
The recent well-publicized reversals of the convictions of five New York City
teenagers, ages 15 to 17 at the time of the attack, accused of brutally raping a female
jogger in Central Park, illustrates the vulnerability of adolescents to giving false
confessions.218 More than a decade after their convictions and after some had served long
prison sentences, the real attacker came forward and confessed to the crime.219 DNA tests
of Mr. Reyes semen and other materials confirmed his presence at the crime scene. The
absence of DNA evidence from any of the five teens at the crime scene motivated their
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exoneration, in addition to inconsistencies in the details they provided on the victim’s
clothing and the attack itself.
The persistence of false confession cases involving both the young defendants
described by Professors Tanenhaus and Drizin, and the older teenagers in the Central Park
jogger case, coupled with the laboratory evidence of adolescents’ susceptibility to
suggestion and vulnerability to coercion, place adolescents at elevated risk of making false
confessions to both capital and other serious crimes. In experiments and other laboratory
studies, the spread in susceptibility scores in these experiments suggests that many
defendants older than 16 would be prone to false confessions.220 And, while these studies
involve adolescents below age 16, most of the Central Park defendants were above 16 and
death-eligible had theirs been a capital case.
The Supreme Court in both Gallegos and Haley has been concerned with two
primary problems in the interrogation of minors. The first inquiry is whether or not a
juvenile has the capacity to comprehend his or her Fifth Amendment rights against selfincrimination. Although the standard Miranda warning is given, there are arguments that the
vocabulary contained in the Miranda warning is too advanced for a teenager’s
comprehension or that the warning is not given to children until after a confession has
already been attained. The second question revolves around the reliability of “voluntary”
confessions of juveniles in police custody. Given the emotional and intellectual immaturity
of minors, both the condition and process of interrogation may seriously jeopardize the
reliability of a confession, and place them at risk for a death sentence and the specter of
wrongful execution.

G. Converting Mitigation to a Categorical Exceptions of Juveniles from Capital
Punishment
The convergence of scientific evidence on immaturity from developmental
psychology with the nascent evidence in biology raises the question of a categorical
exception to criminal punishment generally for juveniles. That is not at issue in this essay,221
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From the outset of the juvenile court, its founders recognized that some youths would
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although a variety of rationales have been advanced for a categorical reduction in sentence
severity for adolescents.222 Here, for proportionality considerations, and precisely because
death is different, a general exception should apply to the most severe form of
punishment.223 The Thompson Court stated, in effect, that immaturity was categorically a
mitigator of culpability in capital cases, but that case-by-case determinations might not
adequately protect all juveniles so exposed.224 In other words, the “narrowing
jurisprudence” of adult death penalty cases – emphasizing the avoidance of unwarranted
death sentences via procedural rules – would not work for juveniles. Moreover, the recent
high rates of jurisdictional waiver or transfer of adolescent offenders to adult court suggests
that the boundary between the juvenile court – where the mitigating status of adolescence is
internalized into the court’s jurisprudence225 – and the criminal court that ignores it, has
been severely breached.226 The mitigation doctrine loses its case-by-case force where there
is a flood of “waived” juveniles facing long and harsh terms of criminal punishments for
crimes far less serious that murder.
If adolescent murderers are less culpable than their adult counterparts because of
developmental deficits, and they are particularly vulnerable to false confessions and other
limitations in adjudicative competence, then this immaturity places them well below the
threshold of culpability articulated in the U.S. Supreme Court’s “death-is-different”
jurisprudence. This applies to adolescents as a group that differs in its culpability for its
offenses, not a simply as subgroup of criminal offenders. Accordingly, the presumption of
immaturity can be applied to most individuals in the age group, based on predictable
trajectories of adolescent development. Alternately, individualized assessments leave triers
of fact at the mercy of imperfect diagnostic assessments to determine which adolescents are
“mature” and which are not.
Moreover, categorical exemptions reduce the likelihood of racial or regional
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variation in the determination of who is death-worthy and who is not.227 This determination
is even more complicated for juveniles than adults given the externalities that arise when
juveniles commit well-publicized homicides.228 Recent data show for example, that there is
an unavoidable conflation of race and homicide, raising further tensions in the search for
justice.229 Indeed, the conflation of race and blameworthiness is a disturbing specter that
unfortunately has a long and painful history in criminal justice.230 In capital cases, such
determinations about culpability seem to fall more heavily on African Americans and other
ethnic minorities,231 and complicated by the structural circumstances that obstruct
assignment of competent and experienced capital defense counsel. 232 It also insulates
against the limitations of scientific instruments to accurately distinguish who is mature of
judgment and who is not.233
In Atkins, the Court created a categorical exception for the mentally retarded
because, like adolescents, their culpability is seriously diminished and the risk of false
confession is high. Why, then, is there not a similar exception for adolescents? How can
the law recognize and express the recognition of diminished responsibility among the less
culpable mentally retarded who commit murder, but not of the less culpable juveniles who
do the same? And if so, how?

227

Glen L. Pierce and Michael L.Radelet, Race, Region and Death Sentencing in Illinois, 198897,
in
Illinois
Commission
on
Capital
Punishment
(2002)
(available
at
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/techinical_appendix/reasearch_report.html) (visited April
12, 2003).
228
See, for example, the case of Lionel Tate. Michael Browning et al., Boy, 14, Gets Life in TV
Wrestling Death: Killing of 6-Yr.-Old Playmate Wasn't Just Horseplay, Florida Judge Says, Chi. SunTimes, Mar. 10, 2001, at 1 (noting that the death occurred while Tate was "allegedly demonstrating
wrestling techniques on her"); Dana Canedy, At 14, a Life Sentence: Boy Killed Girl in 'Wrestling'
Murder, Dallas Morning News, Mar. 10, 2001, at 1.
229
See, Franklin E. Zimring, A MERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE (2000); Barry C. Feld, BAD KIDS, supra
note 105.
230
See, for example, Samuel Walker et al., THE COLOR OF JUSTICE (2001).
231
Glen L. Pierce and Michael L.Radelet, Race, Region and Death Sentencing in Illinois,
1988-97, in Illinois Commission on Capital Punishment (2002) (available at
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/techinical_appendix/reasearch_report.html) (visited April
12, 2003).
232
Incompetent defense counsel is the major source of serious trial error in capital cases,
producing a corrosively high rate of sentencing and trial errors. See, James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan,
Andrew Gelman, et al., A Broken System, Part II: Why There Is So Much Error in Capital Cases, and
What Can Be Done About It, Columbia University School of Law (2002) (available at
www.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/, visited March 21, 2003).
233
See, generally, Scott and Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra n.129.

ATKINS, ADOLESCENCE AND THE JUVENILE DEATH P ENALTY

2003]

55

IV. ATKINS AND THE MATURITY HEURISTIC OF
THE DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES
The categorical exception to capital punishment granted in Atkins should be
applied to juveniles who commit murder. The competencies of to make decisions to engage
in crime occupy common psychological ground with decisions made by those whose
capacities are impaired by emotional disturbance or mental illness: susceptibility to or
domination by peers, inability to control impulses, and the inability to grasp the
consequences of their acts. Just as there is controversy, however, over measurement of
mental retardation and determinations of the thresholds that apply,234 the components of
“immaturity” among juveniles similarly invite similar complications both in terms of
measurement and of clinical interpretation.
Drawing these boundaries poses both normative and scientific challenges. The
difficulties and statistical error rates in measuring immaturity for juveniles invite complexity in
the consistent application of the law.235 The emerging jurisprudence of mental retardation
may well create the same tensions and dilemmas.236 The choice of a fixed boundary either
for immature adolescents or mentally retarded adults brings with it another set of problems
– the unacceptable risks of trial and sentencing errors that could lead to executions of those
whose culpability fails to reach constitutional thresholds,237 or whose false confessions may
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lead to tragic and unthinkable miscarriages of justice.
The execution of an adolescent who is less than fully mature – whose capacity for
choice is impaired by immaturity in the dimensions of cognitive and emotional development
that adulst have achieved – meet this definition of error. There is considerable variability in
adolescent development, both between individuals for specific components of maturity, 238
and within individuals for these same components. This variability in adolescent
development means that by ages 17, 18 or perhaps even age 20, many will not reach the
developmental thresholds of maturity on the markers of culpability established by Atkins,
the same markers that have been validated and confirmed by social and emerging biological
science of adolescent development as reliable predictors of full capacity for competent and
mature behavioral choices.
Consider one developmental dimension – consequential judgment. Because the
development of consequential judgment is a normal function, we have no reason to assume
that the distribution of this or any other developmental competence is exceptional for youths
engaged in criminal conduct. Indeed, we can assume a “normal” distribution of
development. Typically, social science shows that the attainment of any feature of
development follows a “normal” distribution,239 where most persons reach a threshold by a
certain age – for example, 16 years, but some reach this threshold well before this age and
others reach it well after this age. This type of distribution is known as a “bell-shaped
curve,” and is characteristic of the distribution across populations of many features of
social, psychological and physical development.240
Let us assume that on this measure, then, empirical studies show that the most
teenagers reach the test score threshold of maturity (that is the generally accepted threshold
of maturity for this dimension) at 16 years of age. That is, given a normal distribution, most
teenagers – about two in three – have reached this threshold of maturity at that age.
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Accordingly, a considerable percentage – perhaps a third – of all adolescents have not fully
matured on this dimension by age 16. Let us assume, also, that the standard deviation for
this measure241 – the spread in the distribution of ages at which adolescents reach the
threshold of maturity for this specific dimension – is equivalent to approximately one year of
age. That means that by age 17, perhaps one in six still is immature in this dimension of
maturity. By age 18, perhaps one in 15 still lacks this specific capacity for choice and
maturity of judgment.
But the heuristic of maturity becomes more complex when we recognize that
several dimensions of adolescent development comprise maturity.242 Now, consider that
these several dimensions of psycho-social maturity are less than perfectly correlated, and
cannot be substituted for one another.243 The determination of maturity then would require
independent assessments over several dimensions. We can reasonably expect that the
probability of reaching a threshold of maturity along several of these dimensions will require
a complex calculation, where the joint or conditional probability of an adolescent reaching
the accepted threshold of maturity along more than one dimension compounds and
becomes increasingly small. Under current death penalty jurisprudence, each dimension of
immaturity is a potential mitigator.244 The cumulative probability that a minor may be
immature grows incrementally as a defendant falls farther and farther below the high
threshold of culpability for a capital offense, increasing the risk of sentencing error under the
U.S. Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence. The risk grows larger when we
compound this calculus across several dimensions of maturity and culpability.
Although the law is otherwise comfortable with bright lines to legally define
competencies for adolescents,245 the threshold for the attainment of sufficient maturity to
attribute culpability in capital cases is a far more complex determination. Because what is
at stake is death, the boundary cannot be determined simply by examining the average age
by which most adolescents attain one or any number of the several indicia of maturity. In
addition to these expected age thresholds, variability in the pace at which most adolescents
reach that threshold is critical. Variability means that a substantial proportion of
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adolescents at ages 18, 17 or 16 are likely to score well below the threshold for maturity,
including many of the the constituent elements of retardation identified in Atkins.246 That is,
some non-negligible percentage of adolescent murderers will not have achieved the
threshold of culpability that capital jurisprudence requires. A death sentence handed down
to a defendant who is below 18 years of age and who is substantially immature in impulse
control and emotional regulation, for example, might invite the most serious form of capital
sentencing error – the condemnation of a youth whose culpability does not rise to
constitutional standards – in perhaps 10 percent or more of the cases involving offenders
below age 18 at the time of their crime. When the determination of culpability is
compounded across multiple dimensions of immaturity, the denial of the reality of this
variability in favor of an absolute threshold of maturity at 17 or even 16 years of age invites
the prospect of fallibility – error – on at least one or more dimensions of mitigation tied to
immaturity.
There is an obvious and important tension between this maturity heuristic and
normative views of adulthood and maturity. Normative views might assign maturity for
criminal culpability at a specific age, based on broad societal views of what capacities most
adolescents have attained by that age. But the empirical reality of a progression of
adolescent maturation that occurs variably over several dimensions or indicia of culpability,
creates a complex calculus of maturity based on multiple dimensions of adolescent
development. In fact, there are two normative tensions in this framework, one that reflects
concerns over the execution of minors, and a second arising from concerns of death penalty
advocates for penal proportionality. Tipping in one direction or the other has “legitimacy”
costs – for opponents of the death penalty, the moral authority of law and legal institutions
is threatened when capital punishment is imposed unjustly. For supporters of capital
punishment, the moral authority of the criminal law is corroded when punishments do not
scale proportionately to the severity of the crime or the culpability of the offender.247 A
maturity heuristic offers a rationalization under current death penalty jurisprudence for
withholding executions for offenders as old as 21, when the risk of error due to false claims
of maturity declines to near zero.248 That is not the case now: under Stanford, and despite
the immaturity of many adolescents at ages 16, 17 or even at 18, execution is permitted,
inviting the risk of execution of adolescents whose immaturity renders them not fully
culpable for their crimes.
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Resolution of this tension may come from the law’s comfort with bright lines of
maturity that apply to specific competencies. For many legally regulated areas, including
those that require the skills associated with maturity, there is a generally accepted upper
boundary of 18 for nearly all behavioral functions of adulthood.249 Many of these roles
require mature judgment (i.e., voting, medical consent), others require behavioral regulation
(i.e., drinking, military service). The states assign criminal liability to wrongdoing at no more
than age 18, although many assign it at even younger ages for specific crimes. For some
offenses and offenders, the threshold drops as low as 13 years of age.250 However, the
elevated arrest rates of adolescents tried as adults may be a sign that the assumption of
maturity that informs these legal policies evidently is flawed.251
The balancing of tensions among this triad of normative concerns suggests that
perhaps the norms of the Kent 252 and Gault 253 eras of juvenile jurisprudence should apply
to the threshold of capital culpability for adolescents. Not long ago, Justice Harry
Blackmun noted how the tension between fundamental fairness and individualized
judgments haunts the administration of the death penalty.254 The juvenile death penalty
epitomizes this tension. Avoiding false assumptions about maturity that can easily lead to
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sentencing errors in capital sentences, maintaining popular demand for penal
proportionality, and sustaining consistency in the threshold for attainment of maturity and
criminal liability, should lead the Court to the conclusion that juveniles should be afforded
the same protection by the Court that the mentally retarded were given in Atkins.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Juveniles and mentally retarded persons are two groups who face substantial risk of
sentencing error when facing the death penalty. Beyond the fact that their disabilities are
mitigating factors in assessing criminal conduct, these disabilities place each group at
substantial risk for providing false confessions, 255 as well as limiting their ability to
competently and, to use the language of Atkins, meaningfully assist defense counsel. 256
Because defendants with diminished competence and culpability face an elevated likelihood
of reversible sentencing error, principles of proportionality should govern these situations.
Accordingly, juvenile defendants, like the mentally retarded, should be exempted from
capital punishment.257
This is a narrowing argument, not a normative one about the moral status of the law
of capital punishment. That is, a categorical exemption juveniles below the age of 18 from
execution is agnostic about capital punishment for those whose maturity and competence
reaches societal norms. The alternative – creating exempted categories such as the
immature or the mentally retarded – invites disputes about how to reliably establish
membership. Although legislatures and appellate courts can create language that
scientifically and reliably expresses the underlying complexity and dimensionality of these
categories, there inevitably will be subjective risks of misdiagnosis, testing error, instrument
unreliability, or other limits of behavioral science.
In the case of juveniles, the significance of “immaturity” as a mitigating factor in
criminal punishment can be reinforced by placing it in the context of its broader role in the
legal regulation of adolescence, and the law’s comfort with bright lines. Here, then, the
reconciliation of normative views of deserved and proportional punishment with social
science evidence of diminished culpability and variability of adolescents in reaching the
thresholds of maturity can reinforce the jurisprudential logic of a ban on executions of
youths who commit murder below 18 years of age.
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This exemption is would avoid many of the of errors that characterize the “broken
system” of capital punishment that is so riddled with serious, reversible error.258 The
empirical reality of capital sentencing suggests that current procedures and jurisprudence
are not reliable in sorting out who is or is not sufficiently culpable. Even when individualized
assessments are conducted using modern scientific and clinical tools, the risks of error due
to measurement and diagnostic limitations suggests that it is neither reliable nor efficient for
each Court to assess the competency of each juvenile individually. The precise conditions
of immaturity, incapacity, and incompetency are difficult to consistently and fairly express in
a capital sentencing context.259 Further, cognitive and volitional immaturity might be easily
concealed by demeanor or physical appearance, and more importantly, obscured by the
gruesome details of a murder and its emotional impact on the victim’s family. These
limitations invite an attribution of culpability to the seemingly remorseless and competent
adolescent whose developmental reality may be exactly the opposite, raising the risk of a
death sentence where it is not deserved.260
The U.S. Supreme Court’s interest in procedural reliability and fairness calls for
action to reduce high risks of sentencing errors. One critical area requiring further attention
is the execution of juveniles, where care and caution are needed to reinforce the judicial
system’s legitimacy. The Missouri Supreme Court is the first to extend the logic of Atkins
to adolescence and ban the execution of persons who commit murder before reaching age
eighteen.261 In reversing the death sentence of Christopher Simmons in Simmons v.
Roper262, the Missouri court located its decision in the intersection of jurisprudential
theories that recognize the diminished capacity of adolescents with the multiple theories of
the Atkins Court. That is, the Simmons Court cited the broad acceptance of the immaturity
of adolescents articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Eddings and Thompson, and
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noted that the risks of false confession attached to juveniles due to the similarity of their
cognitive deficits that informed the Atkins decision. Again invoking Atkins, the Simmons
Court found that such executions violated the U.S. Constitution’s prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment. The Simmons court noted that many adolescents may lack the moral
development and reasoning capacity necessary to satisfy the requirements in capital
jurisprudence of sufficient mental capacity to meet the threshold of “deterrence.”
The Simmons Court also addressed the test of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Stanford that there exist a “a national consensus has developed against the execution of
juvenile offenders,” and the similar challenge issued in Penry. The Simmons Court’s
opinion noted that since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1989 decision in Stanford, no state has
lowered the age for execution from 18 to 17 or 16, five more states have banned the
practice of executing juvenile offenders through legislative action, and a sixth has banned it
through a judicial decision. Including the Missouri decision, a total of seventeen states, in
addition to federal courts, require a minimum age of eighteen for a death sentence. The
Court also noted that the infrequency of execution of juveniles – only six states have
executed a juvenile since Stanford – as further evidence of this emerging national
consensus.263 The Simmons Court also recognized international standards, rejected 14
years ago in Stanford, citing the Convention on the Rights of the Child in its decision.264
Atkins has established a critical path for honoring principles of fairness while
retaining the core jurisprudential theories of immaturity, incapacity and mitigation in capital
punishment. Extending the Court’s Atkins reasoning to sentencing determinations for
juveniles not only maintains the integrity of the Court’s Atkins decision, it more importantly
reduces the risk of executing children who are less than fully culpable for their crimes.
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